# Neg

## Links

### Data

#### Data-collection in service of security sorts feminine subjects into the category of victim which objectifies them and denies them agency

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Hannah, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at University College Dublin. “The (in)security of gender in Afghanistan’s peacebuilding project: hybridity and affect,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 19:4, 411-425, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2017.1279418 LJS

In these sections I trace in my interview data a formal logic of masculinist protection and a corresponding linking of the feminine to an uncertain and hard-to-articulate sense of insecurity. Arguably, “[p]lacing people at the centre of an exploration of peace politics prompts the question … of what work gender was (and is) doing in these sites, given that all social practices operate in and through logics of gender” (Shepherd 2014, 103). Throughout, it becomes clear that “the gendered body in need of securing is female” (McLeod 2015, 59). Yet it also surfaces that international actors are implicated in the creation of the need to secure, both in terms of the need to secure the foreign female self, and Afghan women (Fluri 2009, 2011). When speaking about the interactions between protection and gender in an Afghan peacebuilding context, my respondents’ opinions, experiences and perceptions were marked by hybridity, victories and setbacks, change understood as positive and negative, power and agency playing out in unusual ways. Protection held complex connotations linked to the (in)security of women. For example, Kate pointed out that dominant narratives that coded women as inherently insecure victims with the intention of protecting them were unhelpful: [Y]ou find people mobilizing the discourses of women as passive victims of war and conflict, of women as naturally peaceful. And even though people want to mobilize that discourse to assist women in participating in peace, I think it actually recreates the stereotype about women which I don’t think is particularly useful.5 Sally provided an interesting example of this kind of mobilization: she discussed with great optimism a project that blended innovative crowd-mapping technologies and the reporting of gender-based violence, illustrating a problematic engagement between liberal peace processes and gender-based insecurities: [T]he aim of this project was to enhance the use of innovative tools in reporting about violations of women’s rights … in the form of a map. … You can basically record it by type of the case: rape, kidnapping, stuff like that. Everything what you need, and then you can have access to this data in the visual way, so you can use it for better mediation, or approaching donors, or media [sic]. Here, a globally available data-visualization tool, the Ushahidi platform, is used to reinscribe localized gender insecurities onto a technologically advanced, easily measurable and easily categorized template. This is done so that information can be ordered in the format best suited to donor and media requirements. Yet it can be read as a means of technocratic governance (MacGinty 2012) in which a liberal order subsumes individual abuses within an overarching perspective on gender insecurity that is simplistically sorted, and subject to gendered and racialized logics of identity and expected behaviors: violent/victim-based or protector/protected (Grove 2015). This well-intentioned project was ostensibly designed to try to protect women from insecurity and violence. However, its manifestation echoes Kate’s frustration with dominant narratives about women and her understanding of the ubiquitous stereotyping of Afghan women as victims in order to offer them protection (and the Othering of Afghan men as perpetrators), which undermined their relationship to action and agency, constituting a different kind of insecurity. Kate summed this up by saying, “that idea of the victim Afghan woman – that actually persists even now, so yeah I don’t know how much it has changed.” Tela discussed the negative implications of certain kinds of masculinist protection in Afghan society very directly based on her perception and experience: That protection is really a sort of indicator of the patriarchy that is going on in this society, and we girls, women, daughters, wives, we are considered as the savior of family’s name … a woman if she works, if she studies, something wrong happens to her or she for example makes a mistake then it is all, like – the family loses honor, and the family’s man is mandated to actually do something to protect that honor. So that’s why when they say that we are protecting our girls, we’re protecting our honor. And that protection is actually encircling her, so that she is not able to move anywhere, she’s not able to speak out. … And that’s what they think protection is all about in this society, because it’s really – I think it’s caging rather than protection – so that she is caged, she is shamed, she is not able to make a decision, whoever she wants to marry she has no right to even say. It is us the family who will decide whom she will marry, what she will do, where she will live. So this whole notion of protection is actually caging her, chaining her, because there is this understanding if a woman is free she will be immoral. A logic of masculinist protection threads through Tela’s account, one that leads to a construction of men as protectors and women as “protected” to the detriment of their freedom and security. The way that Tela speaks about “this society” transcends the particulars of individual actions and relationship dynamics. She is speaking in concrete terms but also making reference to a broader sense of a patriarchal climate, an affective climate sedimented over time, in which protection logics prescribe and delineate possibilities, choices and meanings. Carlo echoes this as well, speaking about his perception of how protection operates in an Afghan context: I don’t think they can go back to Taliban period, never, but there is still a very traditional way of thinking about women. Women are the object of the honor of these men but they are not, yeah it is an abstract way of thinking about honor. So if you look at a woman – if another man look at your woman – it is not an honorable thing, if mmm, the woman not behave according to the strict traditions – Islamic law – it is not good [sic]. But it is really more abstract than that, they do it because they’re used to doing it. The way that Carlo presents the logic of masculinist protection here, as abstract and habitual, can be read as an affective force, one in which women are automatically in need of protection by a masculine entity. At another point in the interview, Carlo discussed what he understood to be the vulnerability of foreign women in Afghanistan, linking this to his own capacity as a man to protect women he accompanied in public, allowing them more [but still limited] freedom of mobility: I have a lot of friends in the international community, and of course girls here, women here, are much more restricted; I can go out in the street and I can do things that they couldn’t think to do. They go sometimes around with me, but there is still a restriction. While these gendered contexts and restrictions in the experience of Afghan and international women cannot be equated, taken together they point to an almost precognitive disposition (in that it is not understood as being gendered in any deep sense, just simply natural) in Carlo and more generally to regard international women as in need of masculinist protection, and to perceive a somewhat similar (though not the same) logic operating habitually in the Afghan context. Equally, in the project Sally discussed and the frustration with dominant discourses articulated by Kate, fragments of power hierarchies cut through the meaning of gender, rendering the female state a disempowering one, always referencing it in some uncertain, hybrid way as protected or in need of protection. Discourses and understandings in which women are automatically assigned victim status (and men assumed violent, etc.) are not uncommon in many contexts and institutional frameworks (McLeod 2015). However, in Afghanistan these were arguably shaped by a very specific affective environment – hybridized and bounded by masculinist protection of different kinds.

### Econ

#### Econ link—the aff’s traditional economic analysis assumes women to be a cyclical reserve labor force, forcing women into economically precarious positions and maintain crisis-prone economic structures—turns the aff

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Jill, Professor of Comparative Employment Systems and Director of the Work and Equalities Institute, Alliance Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, UK. “37 GENDERING THE ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC CRISES.” The Routledge Handbook of Feminist Economics. Pp 361-365. LJS

However, improving gender representation, regulating credit or even reducing inequality would not make the economy fully crisis resistant. Instead feminist economists are calling for a more fundamental reorientation of economic policy goals away from growth, measured by GDP or shareholder value, in favor of a more people-centered approach to economic management. For some this reorientation involves, following Sen (1985), enhancing the capabilities of all citizens (Fukuda Parr, Heintz, and Seguino 2013) while others call for a Polanyian conception of embedding the market within the society, so that finance and production would serve the needs of the social reproduction sphere rather than vice versa (Elson 2014). Gender and crisis policies A second issue of concern to feminist economists is how the state responds to economic crises. In the Keynesian demand management era, the expected response of the state to downturns was countercyclical expansionary fiscal or monetary policy. Keynes argued that even using public employment to dig holes in the road and fill them in again would be beneficial. Unfortunately, this construction example appears to have become fixed in policymakers’ minds, for even if most seek to build new infrastructure rather than simply dig holes, their expansionary investment projects almost always focus on physical infrastructure that favors male-dominated sectors. This approach has been challenged by, for example, the UK’s Women’s Budget Group (WBG) that produced Plan F as an alternative approach to promoting growth (WBG 2015), demonstrating that by investing in the care industries instead of construction approximately twice as many jobs would be generated. This approach is feminist as it focuses not only on a sector where most employees are women but also on one that supports the social reproduction sphere, the neglected side of the economy. A related approach was adopted by the Foundation for European Progressive Studies through its “pink” new deal campaign to promote gender equality, including investments in social infrastructure (Corsi 2014). Furthermore, a major report on care by the ILO (ILO 2018) showed that investment in the care economy could be a major source of new jobs worldwide. Thus, one contribution of feminist economics has been to expand the options available for countercyclical investment policies. However, even more problems of gender bias emerged when the macroeconomic focus changed from how to expand the economy to how to reduce public expenditure and deregulate economies. This anti-Keynesian twist emerged first in the 1980s following the Latin American crisis and again in the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s (Elson 2014). In return for the IMF loans needed to survive the crisis, the most affected countries had to agree to implement SAPs and reign in public expenditure. However, as pointed out in Elson’s (1991) well-known gender critique, these policies did not consider the impact on social reproduction. The implicit assumption was that any cuts in public service provision—including, for example, failure to maintain water supplies—would be resolved through more unpaid labor on women’s part (e.g., walking further to fetch water). This uncosted increase in unpaid labor for women also came on top of pressure to increase their wage work to compensate for reduced men’s earnings in the crisis. This critique of SAPs, however, failed to influence responses to the global financial crisis of 2008, particularly after it was converted from 2010 onwards into a sovereign debt crisis. Countries were pressurized to implement austerity policies, a new term for SAPs. The extent by which the financial crisis morphed into a sovereign debt crisis varied by country as did the mechanisms by which private debt was converted into public debt (Karamessini 2013). Where banks were bailed out by taxpayers, public expenditure cuts were implemented to offset the higher debt levels, thereby passing much of the burden onto those most dependent on public expenditure, whether in the form of direct transfers, public sector employment or state-funded public services. Women are a majority of those affected by cuts on each of these indicators in most of the Global North. Austerity policies have involved cuts in benefits and transfers; women often dominate among pensioners, as well as among carers reliant on benefits, though the number of men affected also increased along with the loss of jobs in male-dominated sectors (Karamessini and Rubery 2013). Not only did all countries effectively fail to analyze the gender impact of austerity but also even the official policy commitment to reducing gender inequality disappeared from the European agenda in the immediate aftermath of the crisis (Smith and Villa 2013). Many European countries were required to freeze or restrict both recruitment and pay for the female-dominated public sector workforce, yet the impact on gender equality was not referred to or explored (Rubery 2013). The effects of the public services’ squeeze depended on the state of development of welfare systems; in some cases it involved dismantling care systems (e.g., in the UK) while in others it postponed or halted plans to expand provision to address the care infrastructure deficits (e.g., Spain). Only the wealthier households have the opportunity to use private sector services as a substitute for public provision but this group in practice often relies on the use of informal private services provided by underpaid women. For those unable to access private services the cutbacks could only be met by increased unpaid labor in the family—mainly by women—or by reductions in care. The latter is a very real outcome in countries where it was not feasible for families to fill the gap. For example, in the UK the cutbacks to home-based social care for the elderly have resulted in bed blocking in hospitals in part because the family is unable to fully substitute, either because of geographical dispersion or the now high rate of female employment. Most attention on the impact of austerity has focused on those southern and eastern European countries that came under pressure from the EU and the IMF to cut public expenditure. However, a study of 128 countries in the Global South found that public expenditure was also cut during the austerity period, following expansionary policy in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis (Ortiz and Cummins 2013). Furthermore, Elson (2010a) developed a framework for both the Global South and the North to consider the interactions between finance, production and social reproduction in response to the financial crisis. The analysis of how austerity processes have affected both paid and unpaid work and the overall provision of care has highlighted both the policymakers’ neglect of the social reproduction system and their expectation that they can still rely on women to compensate for gaps in provision. Interestingly, policymakers in Europe have sometimes had to rethink their care policies particularly with respect to childcare, as women have increased their commitment to wage work despite cutbacks. For example, despite being responsible for major cuts to childcare in the 2010–15 period, by the 2015 election the Conservative party was offering employed parents 30 hours of free childcare for children aged three as they feared losing women’s votes (WBG 2018). However, willingness to reverse or adjust austerity policies to minimize the impacts on the vulnerable depends on the political orientation of the government. For example, the leftwing Greek government succeeded in implementing a major expansion in childcare provision (Hatzivarnava-Kazassi and Karamessini 2018) despite facing the most severe fiscal retrenchment requirements by making creative use of European social funds. The motivation, however, was to address child poverty, not gender equality per se. A comparison of Canada and Spain has also revealed the importance of the policy orientations of the national governments (Lahey and de Villota 2013). The Canadian conservative government was already slashing expenditure before the crisis while the Spanish socialist government tried to mitigate the impact on women. Lahey and De Villota (2013) found that had the Spanish socialist government remained in power past 2011 and continued its policies, the adverse impact on women would have been greater in Canada than in Spain, despite the more favorable overall economic conditions. Crises and women’s labor force participation The initial feminist explorations of women’s labor force participation during crises relied on the Marxist industrial reserve army theory (Bruegel 1979). Although Marx did not specifically identify women as a source of the industrial reserve army, for many economists—both Marxist and mainstream—they constitute the apparently ideal flexible labor force, to be drawn in to fill labor shortages in the boom and expelled in the downturn. This flexible supply both limits workers’ power in the upturn as mobilizing new supplies of labor reduces the risk that labor shortages will lead to industrial unrest (Kalecki 1943) and reduces the risks of high open unemployment in the downturn as the dismissed women are assumed to return to domestic work. Feminist economists have challenged this conceptualization of female labor as a constantly available flexible resource on a number of grounds. First, Humphries (1983) criticized the construction of the industrial reserve army thesis as applied to women as the cyclical reserve army. This she considered a distortion of Marx’s theory of the constant reproduction of relative surplus population that acted as the floating part of the reserve army to provide potential substitutes for those currently employed in order to exert pressure on them to work intensively and accept low wages or face substitution and displacement. From a Marxist perspective the objective of integrating women into the wage labor force was more for long-run secular reasons not for cyclical flexibility, namely to convert them into the floating reserve, to act as a potential threat to men’s jobs and working conditions. However, the extent to which women act in practice as either a cyclical or secular reserve army has also been shown to be restricted once a gender perspective is adopted. One of the restrictions is the pattern of gender segregation in the labor market which restricts the potential for women to act as either a buffer or a substitute for men in employment (Bruegel 1979; Rubery and Tarling 1982; Rubery 1988). A second critique of the cyclical reserve army thesis is that the women’s integration into wage work induces changes in both household organization and in women’s expectations and aspirations which make any reversal unlikely. This approach regards the system of social reproduction as developing “relatively autonomously” from the system of production (Humphries and Rubery 1984). The reversal of women’s participation may thus be constrained by new social norms of higher shares of wage goods in household consumption, by associated changes in relative prices and productivity between domestically produced and wage goods and services, and the changing expectations and aspirations of women, reinforced by investments in their skills and education. This persistence of women’s active participation even under low labor demand could result in women acting as a secular reserve army, threatening substitution for men’s jobs, as has been feared by trade unions at various points in history, particularly after the world wars (Milkman 2016). However, this substitution threat again depends, as I review below, on the potential for desegregation of jobs and on whether women do act as a low wage reserve army. In countries where women are fully integrated into the wage labor market and institutions ensure a high level of gender equality in work, the threat from women as a substitute labor supply may be considerably reduced. These critiques of women acting as a cyclical reserve have largely been accepted by Marxist or other nonmainstream economists but it is mainstream economists that have relied more on the notion of women continuing to act as a contingent labor supply in their modeling, thereby implicitly regarding women everywhere to be mothers first. Not only are women assumed only willing to participate in employment if this is compatible with their prior care responsibilities but they are also assumed to be ready to return to full-time unpaid care work if demand for female wage labor declines. This approach was taken to extremes by Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2007) who argued that trade unions would prioritize raising pay in sectors where the displaced workers—mainly women or young people—would be happy to return to other activities (care work or studies respectively) and to be maintained by other family members, thereby reducing the social costs of the resulting reduced labor demand (see Rubery 2011 for critique). Such grand generalizations of both trade union strategies and women’s behavior lack plausibility; not only are trade-union strategies far from centrally coordinated in many countries but also women’s willingness to return to unpaid care work will depend both upon their expectations and aspirations and on their access, for example, to unemployment benefits, training and redeployment opportunities. Women in Sweden who enjoy strong rights for flexible working and maternity leave benefits provided they are in employment are unlikely to willingly exit the labor market. Moreover, taking breaks from employment during periods of child raising has been declining across all European countries, except when funded through long-term parental leave schemes. Feminist economists stress the importance of context in assessing women’s participation response to economic crises, as attention to context opens up the possibility for change in gender relations, in contrast to mainstream economists’ search for universal sexrelated behavioral responses (see Rubery 2011). Feminist scholars have also examined the impact of crises at the individual household level on time spent in paid work and unpaid work. These micro level and household-specific responses may have aggregate impacts on overall labor supply but these may be small if the added-worker effects in some households are offset by discouraged-worker effects in others. In the recent global crisis and austerity period there is evidence of significant added-worker effects that often outweighed discouraged worker effects. In one study of 28 transition economies, Khitarishvili (2013) distinguished between a household-specific added-worker effect and an aggregate discouraged worker effect induced by the less favorable macro environment; while the discouraged-worker effect dominated among men, the added-worker effect dominated women’s responses. One study in Spain (López Andreu and Rubery 2018) found significant evidence of added-worker effects that occurred through various mechanisms, involving reduced labor market quits for domestic reasons, increased flows from inactivity to unemployment as well as employment, and increased take up of part-time work but on an involuntary basis as full-time work could not be found. A comparative study of Spain and Portugal of women from lowincome households found that despite decreases in pay, security and work-life balance, women’s attachment to the labor market strengthened, induced in part by the increasing importance of women’s earnings to household income (Tavora and Rodríguez-Modroño 2018). Berik and Kongar (2013) also found evidence in the US of narrowing gender gaps in both paid and unpaid work as men’s paid work declined and women substituted paid hours of work for unpaid hours (while men’s total work hours declined). In countries with large informal sectors the alternative to formal sector work may be engaging in the informal sector. Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2009) found that women entered informal employment in all the countries affected by the Asian crisis and consequently suffered from falling rates of remuneration, a pattern that was repeated in the 2008–09 crisis (Ghosh 2013). Although evidence on impacts on unpaid work hours is limited, one can anticipate that many women are under pressure to increase both paid and unpaid working hours to offset both lower men’s earnings and reduced public services. In a study of six low- and middle-income countries, Elson (2010b) found that women were increasing unpaid work hours but this was not providing anything like full compensation for the decline in household income. In some countries, austerity policies are also being used to extend the pressure on those with heavy care responsibilities such as lone mothers to engage in wage work (Whitworth and Griggs 2013). It is also employment among older women that is rising fastest across Europe under requirements to work longer for pension entitlements due to women’s interrupted careers and the ending of the social norm that women should be able to retire earlier than men. In the decade up to 2018 employment rates of those aged 55–64 rose in the EU28 by 10.7 percentage points for men but by 15.9 percentage points for women (Eurostat 2019). These efforts to increase participation may be interpreted as both an austerity policy to reduce welfare costs and a strategy to increase work discipline (Greer 2016). Crises, segregation and gendered labor market outcomes One of the key critiques of the cyclical reserve army characterization of women has been that women and men are not straightforward substitutes in the labor market due to the prevalence of gender segregation. Gender segregation by type of firm and occupation constrains women’s roles as a cyclical reserve in a number of ways. First, where the crisis has uneven sectoral impacts it is highly likely that the immediate pattern of job loss will be shaped by the pattern of gender segregation by sector prior to the downturn. Gender segregation may thus either protect women from or expose women to job loss. In the 2008 crisis, initially male-dominated segments, such as manufacturing and construction, were most seriously affected, leading to the crisis being called a “man-cession,” but the following austerity-driven crisis threatened key areas of women’s employment such as the public sector leading to often more job losses or other losses of income for women workers (Karamessini and Rubery 2013). These effects of gender segregation are thus contingent on the nature of the crisis. In other respects, the pattern of gender segregation may be considered itself in part shaped by cyclical and long-term restructuring of the production system. The cyclical reserve army hypothesis might expect women to be concentrated in those occupations that face the heaviest job losses, for example in manufacturing in the more labor-intensive processes (Bettio 1988). The concentration of women in such vulnerable employment areas may be related both to their relative disposability and to their availability at low wages. This buffer hypothesis with respect to gender segregation was tested for the 1970s/80s recessions for the UK, US, Italy, and France and the overall result found some evidence of women acting as a buffer in some manufacturing industries, but not overall or in services (Rubery 1988). In the more recent crisis, not only has manufacturing declined in significance but also results suggest that young people and migrants were more often the buffer labor force than women (Bettio et al. 2013).

### Liberalism/ Realism

#### Both realist and liberal approaches to IR recreate a patriarchal world order—traditional views of war and peacebuilding either elide gendered violence altogether or acknowledge it while supporting the structures that allow gendered violence to continue

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There are three points that we wish to make in relation to this analytical move. First, that we seek to build on the ‘four generations’ framework to highlight gender blind-spots. A feminist gaze could ask how and why this narrative is frequently reproduced or note that, by paying it attention, we are reproducing patriarchal ideas where feminism has been marginalised and excluded from the account. We deploy the ‘four generations’ framework because it is a reference point for both feminist10 and critical scholars.11 It allows us to chart the connections and concerns shared between critical and feminist PCS, whilst demonstrating the entrenched history of feminist marginalisation from thinking about peace and conflict. Despite its rich heritage, feminist work frequently receives token acknowledgement by critical scholars rather than sustained engagement and analysis.12 This highlights that scholarship is deeply political and deeply saturated in (gendered, racialised, classed) power relations, a point that feminists have long recognised.13 Using the ‘four generations’ framework as our starting point for a feminist intervention allows us to be attentive of gender blindness and to develop a more holistic understanding of PCS. There is therefore a political purpose to telling this story. Second, we believe that the marginalisation of feminist theorising on peace and conflict is reflected within practices of peacebuilding. The citational myopia and other patterns of exclusion faced by feminist scholarship is mirrored in practice, with gender concerns often ghettoised by policymakers and practitioners. For example, the UN’s expanding ‘Women, Peace and Security’ (WPS) Agenda is rarely, if ever, discussed by scholars not typically working within feminist ‘camps’. Furthermore, research on gender within the UN Peacebuilding Commission demonstrates that references to WPS are rare within documents produced by the Peacebuilding Commission.14 Moreover, there is a ‘tendency to describe the WPS agenda as a “normative” agenda, and to engage with questions of women’s participation as normative questions’. 15 Our article focuses on the marginalisation of scholars who examine the ghettoization of women and/or gender issues in practice. If we are to meaningfully transform the way that gendered and feminist goals are addressed within peacebuilding, then the ‘theoretical’ and ‘academic’ space is a productive starting place. Finally, this is not to say that feminist and critical PCS scholars should ‘merge their perspectives, modes of inquiry, and strategies for action’. 16 We agree with Christine Sylvester’s argument that there are ‘too many healthy ambiguities within women, and within feminist theories, for there to be any healthy reconciliation of feminist and peace projects’. 17 Rather, we want to realise and acknowledge the ways that feminist scholarship and its heritage is central to critical PCS, and that continuing to marginalise feminist analysis will result in deficiencies and limitations in our analysis of peace and conflict. First generation approaches: conflict management & achievement of negative peace Conflict management approaches – associated with international negotiation, mediation, and traditional peacekeeping – are largely inspired by the realist belief in the inevitability of conflict and the impossibility of achieving resolution.18 These focus narrowly on managing conflict situations and achieving ‘negative peace’19 by halting overt violence. The aim is to reinforce international order and security by ‘isolating’ and ‘containing’ conflict.20 There is shared agreement between critical and feminist PCS regarding the inadequacies of conflict management approaches for building sustainable peace. Traditional peacekeeping missions, for example, hold a mixed record in limiting armed conflict, and are ‘virtually uniform’ in their failure to achieve conflict resolution.21 They rarely created the conditions for peace, and worked largely to ‘freeze’ rather than resolve conflict.22 Women and gender issues were largely excluded from traditional peacekeeping missions: for instance, between 1957 and 1989, the number of women participating in the military component of peacekeeping missions was a mere 0.1%.23 Furthermore, the coercive power wielded by armed peacekeepers is criticised by feminists – for reproducing violent masculinities which (re)create gendered forms of insecurity,24 and for perpetuating relations of domination which are at the root of violent conflict.25 Traditional diplomacy, meanwhile, frequently produced settlements based on ‘peace without justice’ and often found it difficult to address the rising number of intra-state conflicts due to its state-centric view of conflict.26 Feminist scholars have documented the long-standing absence of women from formal peace negotiations.27 Obstacles include highly gendered norms and practices of diplomacy, which associate negotiations and mediation with men, masculinity, and military affairs.28 The lack of recognition of women as significant peace-making actors is another factor; as is the priority afforded to high-level political and military actors (usually men), at the expense of women’s interests and demands.29 From a feminist perspective, conflict management approaches, in theory and in practice, reflect and sustain a ‘cult of power’ within peace research – one which marginalises the perspectives and contributions of relatively ‘powerless’ non-state actors, including many women, girls, and non-binary people.30 Furthermore, the goal of promoting negative peace, is strongly criticised by feminists, who point out that this leaves (gendered) forms of direct violence (e.g. gender-based violence), structural violence (patriarchy), and cultural violence (militarism) unaddressed.31 Second generation approaches: conflict resolution & fulfilment of human needs ‘Second generation’ conflict resolution approaches to ending conflict emerged in response to the limitations of conflict management methodologies, and take the view that conflicts can be resolved rather than merely managed.32 These approaches aim to create grass-roots mechanisms and processes capable of j conflicts.33 Through problem-solving workshops, third-party facilitation, and project-oriented approaches, bottom-up methods are employed to address the social, psychological, and structural roots of conflict.34 Feminist scholars and activists have challenged the absence of women, gender, and feminist insights from conflict resolution theory and practice.35 Conflict resolution approaches are appealing, given that they engage civil society in peacebuilding, and promote a peace based around mutual agreement and justice.36 They advocate a shift from official, Track I diplomacy towards the use of unofficial, Track II initiatives. These processes are designed to enable all parties to feel that they have ‘won’ 37 by satisfying basic needs – to security, recognition, political representation, and economic participation – which are considered the root causes of conflict.38 Furthermore, the techniques deployed by third-party mediators are designed not to achieve manipulation or control, but rather to assist conflicting parties in processes of self-realization and immanent transformation,39 and a true resolution rather than a compromise or settlement.40 This may unlock possibilities for achieving a self-sustaining peace.41 Yet, despite their early promise and innovative techniques, commentators have questioned the efficacy of these methods.42 Critical PCS scholars highlight that, if undertaken without adequate consideration of the impact of asymmetric power relations and structural constraints, conflict resolution will merely strengthen the stronger party’s position and (re)produce conditions of domination, injustice, and inequality.43 The isolation of peace-making from the social and cultural context in which conflict is embedded is also identified as a major weakness.44 Feminist researchers critique the ‘gender-blindness’ of mainstream theories and practices for excluding women from Track II mediation (as facilitators and participants); and note that problem-solving workshops often fail to consider the significance of gender for conflict analysis and resolution.45 Without explicit discussion of how gender roles, identities, and structures of power are entangled in conflict and its resolution, Track II initiatives may create the ‘impression that conflict and war are genderless phenomena’. 46 To ensure that conflict resolution processes and outcomes are gender-just, feminists identify the need for theorists and practitioners to build theories and methodologies that can identify and address context-specific gender norms, identities, and power structures in sites of conflict, and also recognize the ‘practical’ and ‘strategic’ gender interests of women situated in conflicted contexts.47 Third generation approaches: the liberal peace Women, gender, and feminism have historically been relegated to the margins of PCS, as our discussion of the first and second generations illustrates. Yet, from the 1990s onwards, major transformations in peace operations were accompanied by a growing acceptance that gender equality is a significant aspect of peacebuilding. After the Cold War, internationally supported peacebuilding missions were legitimated by the aim of building a ‘liberal peace’.- 48 Peacebuilding interventions in sites of conflict followed a standardised, top-down model of reconstruction that prioritises Western politico-cultural norms and neo-liberal economics.49 Liberal peacebuilding combines traditional forms of peacekeeping, mediation, and negotiation, with a range of activities designed to promote democratisation and good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law, active civil society, and the development of open market economies.50 Such missions were deployed in Africa (Namibia), Asia (Cambodia), Europe (Croatia), and Latin America (El Salvador), from as early as 1989.51 In many contexts, the United Nations and other international peacebuilding actors have held extensive mandates to organise elections, reshape military and civil administration, maintain law and order, repatriate and resettle refugees, and rehabilitate infrastructure.52 What is clear is that conflict management and resolution had moved a long way from simply ‘freezing’ a conflict. In parallel with these changes, peacebuilding actors increasingly recognised the genderspecific impact of armed conflict, and the significant role that women play in all aspects of peacebuilding. Significantly, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in October 2000, which urged for the integration of a gender perspective across UN peace and security processes. To date, a total of eight WPS resolutions have been adopted.53 Taken together, these resolutions articulate an agenda to prevent sexual and gender-based violence, encourage the meaningful participation of women in peace and security processes, and to protect women’s rights in conflict and post-conflict contexts. The effects of the WPS agenda has been surprisingly pervasive and wide-ranging. It has shaped funding and agendas across the UN system; programmes of national governments and regional organisations54; influenced feminist activism across the world55; and academic interest in the WPS agenda can be described as ‘an industry’.56 Feminist scholars and activists have fought hard to integrate women and gender perspectives into peacebuilding. Yet, significant obstacles to gender justice and equality remain. For example, between 1992 and 2011, only 2 percent of chief mediators and 9 percent of negotiators in peace processes were women.57 And, of 85 peace agreements signed between 1990 and 2010, only 16 percent contained any references to women and/or gender.58 Post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives frequently (re-)produce a ‘patriarchal gender order’.59 There is an ongoing need to challenge masculinist visions of peace as a process which excludes women, and as an outcome which fails to tackle gender-based violence and provide for gender justice and equality.60 Liberal peacebuilding interventions have been roundly critiqued by both critical and feminist PCS scholarship. Both ‘camps’ have, for example, highlighted the gulf that exists between the normative agenda espoused by liberal peacebuilding actors and the everyday realities of those groups and communities affected by peace and conflict.61 Both approaches have examined the unequal encounters, narratives and interactions between ‘local’ and ‘international’ actors in conflicted and post-conflict settings.62 They note the tendency for peace and security interventions to reinforce, rather than disrupt, hierarchical structures and relations of power,63 and have examined the differential capacities of peacebuilding subjects to respond in agential and resistant ways.64 In particular, critical PCS has questioned the failure to engage with the everyday needs, voices, and interests of ‘local’ stakeholders.65 Peacebuilding, they argue, has been captured by hegemonic interests and neo-colonial agendas, and the liberal vision of peace is fatally undermined by cultural insensitivity, technocratic rationality, exclusion, and coercion.66 Feminist scholars point to the significant gaps between international rhetoric on WPS, and the reality of implementation.67 They highlight the propensity of liberal peacebuilding actors to articulate essentialist notions of gender and (re)produce gendered hierarchies of power in (post-) conflict environments.68 As the above discussion highlights, there is much that is shared between critical and feminist analyses of peacebuilding. Both have articulated important questions about the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the liberal peace. However, as we outline below, feminist work frequently receives token acknowledgement by critical scholars rather than sustained engagement and analysis. Despite potential connections, the synergies between critical and feminist approaches remain under-explored.

### Military

#### The aff is rooted in masculine ideologies that make any ethical anti-war solutions impossible. Only a radical reconceptualization of masculinity in politics will solve the deep-rooted misogynistic values in the military.

Partis-Jennings 17 (Hannah Partis-Jennings research focuses on gender, performance, and spatial practice in liberal peace paradigms and her PhD, from the University of St Andrews, focused specifically on Afghanistan where she conducted field research in 2014, “Military Masculinity and the Act of Killing in Hamlet and Afghanistan.” Men and Masculinities. 2019; 22(2): 254-272. doi:10.1177/1097184X17718585) -SAJ

Military masculinity is a term to describe the sets of norms and behaviors most valued and aspired to in a military context (Eichler 2014). It includes elements such as physical strength, bravery, a lack of emotions such as fear and sadness, and a denigration of the feminized (p. 82). It is both an individual and an institutional paradigm (Kronsell 2016). Feminist scholarship has grown wary of simplistically engaging military masculinity as a category of analysis noting that it is a fluid and shifting category, complex, and intersectional and that naming it contributes to the process of its construction (see Bulmer 2013; Higate 2003; Welland 2013). I use it here to elucidate how gendered performances of war frame acts of killing as they take place. Yet I also push the boundaries of thinking around military masculinity to argue that it implies a process of performance and interpretation—witnessing performance, telling of it, framing it—as well as of action. Butler writes that our identities are bound tightly together with our vulnerability to others, our inherent need to be defined as an entity in fluid relation to that Other which stands definitional against the “I” (2010, 33). Her conceptions of ethics and the nature of being are connected to our inevitable dependence upon the Other. Yet she sees the notion of relational ethics, of relating to another within an ethical spectrum, as strictly bound within certain logics of war and violence. While soldiers/combatants/wartime populations may be encouraged to develop fierce loyalty to their intimate group/fellow soldiers or citizens, the possibility of relating to the enemy Other is cognitively curtailed. There are nuances and complexities within this, and it is a fluid and performative construction of enmity. Yet, arguably there is a particular conception of the “enemy” employed in traditional performances of military masculinity which shuts down any possibility of understanding them as fully human (Butler 2010; Hearn 2012, 46). This war-based enmity is structured by those who manifest it through cognitive boundary making with gendered and racialized elements such as gendered shaming and the denigration of that which is understood as feminized (Cohn 1987; Mann 2014). Cohn suggests that the masculine ideal fostered by the military is one which validates action over thought, which cultivates the capacity to subdue the thinking mind and is therefore fundamentally “antiethical,” and she argues that many emotions are suppressed in war and hatred is given a prime position in the hierarchy of allowable feelings (1999, 462). Moreover, the capacity and desire to think ethically, to consider the relationality of human existence which might provoke empathy and render violence more difficult, can be coded as feminine and radically denigrated and devalued (Cohn 1987). Arguably, within the context of military training, a certain capacity to act without excessive thought is associated with masculine bravery (Mann 2014). As Hamlet suggests, “conscience does make cowards of us all” where conscience and therefore cowardliness are the domain of the feminized (Shakespeare 2007, 1958). Thus, the supremacy of action over thought and the denigration of relational intellectualizing are gendered and become a justificatory mechanism, a fundamental structure of heroic masculinity which shuts down ethical cognition, policing the boundaries of allowable action. Institutionalized fear of any feminized trend toward nonviolence in the structures of militarism has severe consequences. In the First World War, for instance, the British Army executed 306 of its own soldiers for “cowardliness”—the refusal to fight and kill (Taylor-Whiffen 2011). Cohn’s (1999) analysis of gendered military practices and the film Saving Private Ryan makes the point that one character is symbolically vilified for his feminized capacity to show mercy, and his nonviolent ethic is linked to the subsequent death of heroic masculine soldiers. What is most notable about this notion of cowardliness is the shamefulness it evokes Partis-Jennings 3 (Mann 2014; Cohn 1987). That understood as feminine is purged partially through linking it with shame and the necessity to prove one’s capacity to demonstrate masculine traits, shaming and humiliating those that cannot maintain the “courage, power and authority exclusively associated with masculinity” in the logic of warfare and militarism (Sasson-Levy 2003, 451). In the case of Marine A, the act of killing itself, recorded visually and audibly, is the moment which fixed a performance to be interpreted. Killing as performance is the most intimate act, the most imbued with gendered weight where “militarized masculinities function as spatiotemporal landmarks that give killing in war its‘orientation’ and make it morally intelligible” (Daggett 2015, 361). This perfor-mance of enmity enacted within and through the confusion and fear of active war killing is a site of particular ethical significance. Yet arguably, the echoing up of this performative infrastructure generated by the public availability of the killing is an equally central site of mediated enmity in which the affective centrality of the logic of war becomes evident in a virtual domain (in this article, particularly YouTube anda specifically designed website).To discuss this incident in a way that elucidates a particular performance mili-tarized masculinity, I draw on Shakespeare’sHamlet. I am thus engaging with theso-called aesthetic turn—a mode of understanding and interpretation which“reorients our very understanding of the political” (Bleiker 2001, 511), where by “aesthetic sources are models for rethinking political global predicaments” (L. Frost2010, 435). Using an aesthetic lens to understand aspects of the study of interna-tional relations has interesting lineage (see Bleiker 2001; L. Frost 2010; Holden2006; Jabri 2006; Moore and Shepherd 2010). This approach highlights “[t]he factthat through the work of art a truth is experienced that we cannot attain in any otherway” (Gadamer 1975, 18) and the implications this has for global politics. Thus, in looking at the intertextual dynamics between Hamletand Marine A shooting aninjured Taliban insurgent, I engage with an approach that is both disruptive and reflective, that offers insight while equally making the familiar strange (L. Frost2010) and implicating the interpreters and representations of a given moment in the overarching logic that gives that moment meaning (Jabri 2006; Bleiker 2001, 513).Military masculinity then can be understood as an interpretative framework throughwhich war is read, an aesthetic through which violence is consumed. Technology and virtual consumption are implicated in militarized masculinity as it now exists. Eisenstein argues that “[ign this techno-masculinist world we inhabit we are shown war as the drama of manhood” (Eisenstein 2007, 24), a drama not always dependent on biological sex or particular acts but upon “masculine discourses that can be adopted by males or females” (p. 27) and represented in the wider public domain.

### Securitization

#### Securitization serves to reinforce the US role as masculine protector, subjecting the “protected” to US violence

Partis-Jennings 17

Hannah, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at University College Dublin. “The (in)security of gender in Afghanistan’s peacebuilding project: hybridity and affect,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 19:4, 411-425, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2017.1279418 LJS

Hybridity is described by critical peacebuilding scholars in different ways, however for the purposes of this article it can be understood as the way that aspects of the “international” and aspects of the “local” can “coalesce and conflict to different extents on different issues to produce a fusion” (MacGinty 2010, 397). It involves the merging of the “liberal international order … with other non-liberal indigenous institutions, norms and practices at the domestic level” (Laffey and Nadarajah 2012, 406). Central to the notion of hybridity is the idea that power is flexible and contradictory; that a paradigm of dominance can be shifted and reinterpreted, taken up in different forms and with different intentions, and still maintain the central touchstones of its hierarchies intact (Kothari 2006, 239). McLeod (2015) provides a feminist critique of the concept of hybridity, arguing that a feminist lens elucidates “a nuanced perception of the power relations between local and international actors” (49–50) and that comparing and “contrasting the wartime experiences of local and international actors allows a sense of the organising logics that limit and make possible certain meanings of gender” (59). It is specifically feminist in exploring the “diversity of the personal,” which hybridity normally neglects, and in understanding “international” actors as individuals rather than just as a collective (52). A feminist approach to hybridity understands that “[a]s war and post-war can be experienced in multifarious ways, local and international advocates bring diverse conceptualisations of that war based upon the windows of knowledge that they can access, and have accessed” (49). McLeod suggests a focus on the emotional and the embodied levels of peacebuilding, noting that “how the body ‘feels’ the world impinges upon how the world is experienced and described” (53), and I build further on McLeod’s insights using the notion of affect. Shepherd’s (2014) feminist engagement with peacebuilding suggests “reorienting research towards the affective and relational dimensions of peace activities” (112), and I attempt to do that here. Affect understood as prepersonal is slightly different from particular emotions, and not individual as such, but environmental (Shouse 2005). It is the conditions in which emotions can come to be articulated fully, a sensory perception of the parameters that are set for feelings to be felt. I thus go back a step from McLeod, looking for felt experiences but also the environmental aspects that bring them into iteration. Using both interview data and observation, I perceive affect as “amorphous potential that remains outside of discourse, which is difficult to articulate but none-the-less has effects within discourse” (Solomon 2012, 908).2 In the latter part of the article I “underline the not-necessarily reflexive sensory dimensions of experience by paying attention to the perceptual dimensions of our actions and the habituated and routine nature of everyday existence” (Vannini 2015, 323). This aligns with McLeod’s (2015) view that “hidden or mundane practices and processes operate alongside macro-political processes” in peacebuilding (52). I illustrate how different kinds of interactions in the protection–gender–security nexus in my field research data and experience were affectively coded with deep uncertainty and imbued with power imbalances between masculinist protector and feminized protected. My central argument in this article is that a masculinist logic of protection in peacebuilder security practices helps to create an affective environment in which being female becomes always already hybrid, uncertain and affectively linked to insecurity. Young (2003) develops a framework in which a masculinist protector figure shields a subservient, feminized protected from a dangerous and unknown male Other “out there” who must be securitized against. Should the protected resist, there is an understanding that they would be abandoned to an unknowable threat (14). Thus, the protected and feminized in this paradigm is always subject to the uncertainty of a disempowering safety, a protection that is also an implicit threat. I argue here that the logic of masculinist protection seen in security practices helps to foster the kind of affective environment in which notions of patriarchal protection are constantly underlying and intertwining with gender meanings. This affective environment is a hybrid between the protective logics of security practices linked to peacebuilding, and a sense of traditionalist patriarchal protection frameworks in the Afghan context. I do not mean to equate the experiences of peacebuilding actors with Afghan women who may be subjected to patriarchal control, but to point to an affective hybridity tied to certain kinds of protection logics, in which gender is bounded and delineated. Given the space restrictions of this article, I do not unpack the meaning or reality of traditionalist patriarchal protection frameworks in Afghanistan, but consider references to it in my interviews. My intention here is to investigate how affective environments might relate to gender and (in)security, and how this can be read through the lens of a feminist approach to hybridity in which ideas around Afghan patriarchy, security routines, foreign status and female status mix together.

#### Narratives of insecurity serve to retrench masculine authority and myths of women as victims

Partis-Jennings 17

Hannah, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at University College Dublin. “The (in)security of gender in Afghanistan’s peacebuilding project: hybridity and affect,” International Feminist Journal of Politics, 19:4, 411-425, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2017.1279418 LJS

These extracts also suggest different kinds of cross-cutting complicity between the “international” and a logic of masculinist protection. While there is a constant process of flux and contradiction operating here (particularly in the relationship between international and gender status), there is also an affective gendered order in which, once again, female equates to vulnerability faster and more “naturally” than male ever would. Gendered security praxis In addition to the mode of hybridity demonstrated in how civil society actors talked about the protection–gender–security nexus that I have discussed above, I now move to include a consideration of how less conscious, routine, unnoticed or habitual practices relating to protection and security help to create a gender-liminal space in Afghanistan, marked by hybridity. It is here that my feminist take on hybridity builds most on McLeod’s by prompting questions of embodied and affective power and (in)security. It is not my intention to offer an alternative way of practicing security in dangerous settings, or to suggest that these security procedures are necessarily unjustified. However, a feminist curiosity leads me to explore how these practices are coded with gender in certain ways, and what kind of power dynamics and “embodied subjectivity” (Frerks, Ypeij, and König 2014, 8) this gendering might involve (Shepherd 2014). Since both male and female peacebuilders (and Afghan elites) are protected by these practices, my discussion must be understood in abstract terms, exploring how protection logics are founded on gendered ideas. It is the feminized international (and elite national) body that is secured by routine practices, rather than just women, but the validation of masculinist protection required has affective, gender-laden implications. From what I saw and heard about in Kabul, most business and expatriate homes were guarded by private security personnel – all were men, some were Afghan, many were not. These private security personnel operate through performances of masculinity in various ways, and with varying degrees of theatricality and visibility (Higate 2012a, 2012b). In Afghanistan particularly, because of the high perceived and actual threat level, these masculine performances center on weapons, masculine physicality and a stoic, tough demeanor; often sunglasses and military-style clothing feature strongly, and the notion that these gendered indicators will be perceived as threatening and dominating by others is vital for their success (Connell 2005; Higate 2012b). Performances and props of violence have an undeniably hypermasculine dimension (Higate 2012a, 2012b), particularly when those private security actors wielding or performing them are almost exclusively male, and manifest their working identities through stereotypical tropes of masculine prowess. In my experience, the structures that made up homes, cafes and workplace compounds were also laden with the symbolism of masculinist militarism and aggression – razor wire, high blast-proof walls, guard buildings and watchtowers. In an affective mode, symbols of security such as the fortified aid compound are compatible with an ideology of aggression and Othering connected to a certain kind of (hyper)masculinized frontierism (Young 2003, 2), and a militarized logic that prioritizes masculine dominance in an abstract form – the values associated with notions of masculinity rather than actual men (Hutchings 2008; Hearn 2012). An embodied, spatial and commonsensical dichotomy existed in Kabul between vulnerable/feminized (devoid of the trappings of violence), and the hypermasculine means of violent action that protect against vulnerability (Young 2003; Frerks, Ypeij, and König 2014). Lisa was the only one of my respondents to directly link security practices and the protective infrastructure in Afghanistan to her (in)security. Of all my respondents, Lisa was the most reflexive, and also someone who demonstrated the greatest hybridity in her responses. She was very vocal (as illustrated in the previous section) about feeling unsafe as a woman particularly, and yet equally articulated a sense that this insecurity was exacerbated by the affective environment in which she found herself, an insecurity that went beyond that generated by the Taliban: [T]he securitization of space matters so much, I don’t know that I’m nearly as unsafe as I feel, I used to walk a lot, when I first came I walked all the time, I don’t know that my decision to not walk is really based on anything rational or on the fact that nobody else that I know walks, everywhere you go there is razor wire. I really think that the psychology of conflict architecture, of having blastwalls everywhere, police checkpoints every twenty feet, guys with AK47s everywhere makes you feel deeply unsafe, if you were in a safe place why would it look like it does? Picking up on Lisa’s experience of “guys with AK47s everywhere” and unpacking it further, I suggest that the fortified aid compounds and private security personnel (as well as armored cars, the prevalence of weaponry, security checkpoints, procedures for entering buildings, safe rooms, etc.) generate an affective environment of insecurity that is also gendered. In this context, “narratives of risk and response” created by security personnel or institutions set the parameters for how a given environment can be perceived, and police the mechanisms that can be used to negotiate the everyday contexts of these environments (Higate 2012a, 14). Ideas around masculinity and masculine dominance are engaged in complex relation with this “construction and governance of insecurity and danger” (Berndtsson 2011, 1; Higate 2012a, 20), since “(male) (security) operational rationality” and physical capacity is understood to mitigate risk (Stiehm 1982; Higate 2012a, 17). While private military contractors and personnel provide a gendered narrative and meaning that is often complex and negotiated (Higate 2012c; Eichler 2015), in an affective mode in Kabul these security personnel signaled a hypermasculine frame of reference founded on the visuality of lethal weapons, the macho demeanor of the men wielding them and the implicit understanding that “military calculation” is the “epitome of rationality” (Stiehm 1982, 375; Higate 2012a, 20). Security practices, such as living and working in guarded buildings, traveling with and hiring close protection staff, armored cars, security liaisons and so on, thus create a situation whereby safety and violence are behaviorally conflated, and the trappings and rituals of violence are an affective foundation for any understanding of gender in that environment. It is an environment that martials a precognitive sense of (almost) fear and (always) threat in gendered terms. This raises questions of the extent to which, within the peacebuilder paradigm, the “cultivation of fear and anxiety … was fostered as a disciplinary strategy” that in affective ways “cemented the masculinised protector role rooted in control and authority” (Higate 2012a, 14). In an extract from my field notes I illustrate a sense of oppressive gendering that I almost but not directly linked to the ubiquity of men with guns; I am aware of being female in a negative sense, but it does not seem like I cognitively process why that is the case: Again the feeling of being female was palpable. I could smell the particular kind of bread they cook here. The air was dusty and damp. The streets were quiet. There were a few men sitting around with guns. As usual it was unclear what they were guarding. (Author field notes 1 May 2014) Lisa more explicitly articulated her perception of a feedback loop between masculinized protection, which understood women (and children) as vulnerable and men as their protectors, and the affective impact of security measures: [Y]ou are coming into a society where there is already a very strong tradition of protection around women, part of that is after you have come through decades of sustained conflict and of course men and women experience that differently and especially in Afghanistan, where you have already a patriarchal society, so many children – so there is a need to protect women and children in a conflict environment. When you have this sustained, visible insecurity – in the sense of measures to try to prevent insecurity – it is a further justification to continue this need to protect who you have been protecting all along. I read a visceral understanding in her words, a struggle to make verbal sense of what work a pre-discursive mode of masculinized protection, which seems to self-perpetuate in commonsensical ways, does for gender and for what it means to be female or male in Afghanistan. The fact that the logic of masculinist protection in civilian peacebuilding practices remained just beyond and beneath full articulation (Holland and Solomon 2014), and yet did seem to have affective implications for how my participants thought about gender, would indicate that the affective nature and ubiquity of this logic helps to render it commonsensical. A feminist approach to hybridity pays attention to the way that war or postwar is experienced differently by different actors. Thus looking at the mode of security practices in Afghanistan that are engaged to protect peacebuilding actors (and Afghan elites), and seeing that this operates within a gendered logic, elucidates how gender and security in Afghanistan must necessarily be understood within a liminal space that values masculinized protection. Added to this is the push to demonstrate improvements in women’s rights since 2001, and the perception of a fundamentally patriarchal social context (Billaud 2012). While more research needs to be done on further implications of this dynamic, I suggest that the reliance of peacebuilding practices on a logic of masculine protection, and the coding of hypermasculine signifiers as harbingers of security, influence the affective environment in which gender can be understood, owned, resisted and reinterpreted. In this affective environment, the hybrid interactions between gender and security evidenced by my interview data take on a particular kind of framing. They can be seen to be bracketed by a constant flux and unease, which renders gender, particularly female gender, always already a hybrid, insecure and uncertain concept.

## Perm

### Co-Option DA

#### Co-option DA—combining our tactics with government policy allow neoliberal actors to co-opt the movement

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Critics of contemporary feminism argue that these objectives have recently been cannibalized by neoliberalism. Fraser (2013), Prügl (2015) and Rottenberg (2014), among others, argue strongly that the ‘neoliberalization of’ feminist movement agendas has occurred. This includes the emergence of ‘transnational business feminism’ (Roberts, 2015) whereby states, corporations, international bodies and non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) develop a ‘business case’ for women's equality, and ‘market feminism’ (Kantola & Squires, 2012) whereby products and marketing campaigns draw on feminist notions of ‘choice’ (Kirkpatrick, 2010) and ‘empowerment’ as selling points. Indeed, the ostensibly feminist goals of empowerment, choice and agency have proliferated as buzzwords under neoliberal feminism (Kirkpatrick, 2010; Rottenberg, 2014). These are defined with reference to the advancement of individual women, rather than as a shared struggle in search of collective solutions to advance gender equality in society (Rottenberg, 2014). The neoliberalization of feminism has proliferated in the context of rising corporate power and neoliberal economics (Rottenberg, 2014), and has involved sidelining debates about the gendered, and racialized, structures and substructures which underpin organizations and which perpetuate inequality (Acker, 2006). Yet feminist social movements have not gone away. They are, in fact, alive and kicking. We argue that we need to look more closely at how they are evolving to adopt new strategies for gender equality in the context of an increasingly corporate‐dominated world. It is these strategies that this article elucidates and theorizes in such contexts. By so doing we address the question of how feminist social movements contest the neoliberalization of feminism in an increasingly corporate‐dominated world and develop new strategies for their transformative social change objectives? In addressing these issues, this article focuses on corporations. Corporations have been of long‐standing interest to feminist scholars because they employ large numbers of people globally and have been shown to rely on gender inequality as a resource (Acker, 2006), exploiting women's low pay transnationally and relying upon the unpaid care work done by women to sustain workers and organizations. In this sense, organizations can be conceived of as ‘inequality regimes’ (Acker, 2006). Corporations are also powerful: influencing regulation, business practices and popular culture globally, including gender relations. We argue that the growing economic and political power of corporations, and their global reach, means that the ways in which they do or do not address gender equality have become increasingly important with respect to feminist agendas, and increasingly worthy of investigation (Grosser & Moon, 2017). One of the key ways in which corporations advance more neoliberal forms of feminism is through corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives (Roberts, 2015; Tornhill, 2016a). CSR is a highly contested concept extending to corporate accountability for social and environmental impacts, and involves a wide range of strategies, actions and governance systems relating to workplaces, supply chains, communities and the environment (Crane, Matten, & Moon, 2008). Numerous social movements now focus on and develop strategies to influence corporations, as well as governments, acting as adversaries but also at times as partners (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Mena & Waeger, 2014; Rasche, de Bakker, & Moon, 2013), including in CSR initiatives. Therefore, it would not be surprising to find feminist social movements also campaigning against corporations, participating in CSR initiatives or building new alliances with corporate actors. This article thus explores the ways in which these strategies are emerging amongst feminist social movements. The key argument is that in order to understand the neoliberalization of feminism, and in particular how it is being contested, we need to refocus our attention on feminist social movements themselves, where activism occurs. To this end, we draw upon social movement theory (SMT) (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Pollack & Hafner‐Burton, 2000) to elucidate feminist activist involvement in political opportunities, mobilizing structures and strategic framing processes in the context of new governance involving business as well as government. This article makes two contributions: first, we extend theory with respect to the relationship between CSR and feminism (Grosser & Moon, 2017), contributing to research on the neoliberalization of feminism and providing a conceptual framework for further research on this topic. Second, we provide examples of new kinds of feminist activist strategies that contest the neoliberalization of feminism as advanced by corporations and through CSR. The theory article proceeds as follows. We first define the neoliberalization of feminism, and explore the rising power of corporations and their involvement in new governance systems. We elucidate the growth of CSR and gender initiatives as key sites where neoliberal feminism is being advanced. We then use three key SMT concepts: political opportunities; mobilizing structures; and strategic framing processes, to help us explore how feminist social movements organize and agitate for change. We argue that far from being co‐opted, feminist social movements contest neoliberalism in a variety of innovative ways.

### Intersectionality DA

#### Intersectionality DA—the perm attempts to incorporate feminist analysis without actually doing any of the work

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In my article ‘Problematizing military masculinity, intersectionality and male vulnerability in feminist critical military studies’(2017), I outline some of the innovations in previous research on military masculinity; its plural and more broad formation as militarized masculinities; and some of the new, yet limited, directions of research which pays attention to gender in studies of militarized individuals and communities. In particular, I draw on the work of Crenshaw (1989, 1991), one of the founding black feminist scholars of the concept of intersectionality, in order to share my increasing anxiety with what I argue is a process of depoliticization in critical military studies (CMS). However, to call this depoliticization is itself problematic. What I should have argued is that this is rather a re-politicization and reinforcement of racial, gender, and class hierarchies both inside and outside of formal militaries and within and across a range of academic disciplines. This is evident in the superficial engagement with intersectionality by some military masculinity scholars or the use of intersectionality in what Carbado (2013) calls‘colour-blind’ways which ‘cover over’ privilege1 through the co-optation of a radical and emancipatory body of theories for examining ‘multiple differences’ and which I discuss in more detail (Henry 2017). Scholars who use intersectionality as a framework for challenging interlocking oppressions, and those primarily interested in the interface or the mutually constituting nature of masculinities and militarization, may be engaged in different epistemic and political projects. Yet it is surprising that the feminist inspiration generated by Enloe in the concept of military masculinity (1983) seems to have waned in regard to paying attention to constructions of femininity, femininities, and patriarchy (Enloe 2017). There is a scholarship that pays attention to women in the military, military femininities, and female military masculinities (i.e. Sasson-Levy 2011; Tasker 2002), but this work remains marginal within the subfield of militarized masculinities. Has the potential for critical perspectives within CMS been extinguished by a focus on military masculinity without feminism? Without intersectional feminism? While the subfield of militarized masculinities has been innovative in taking gender seriously in the context of male-dominated institutions, I ask, where are studies that focus on the persistence of patriarchy (Enloe 2017) and militarized femininities as a subject in their own right (Enloe 2015)? While work on Israeli military identities raises a number of questions about intersectionality’s limits, it is evident that the burden of analysing gender (and its intersection with other axes of difference) remains with feminist critical military scholars. However, I argue that militarized masculinities cannot afford to neglect feminist theories and concepts and must engage in the project of smashing what bell hooks refers to as imperialist white supremacist capitalist [hetero] patriarchy (hooks 2006: 60). This means that military/militarized masculinities could return to the critical and radical basis of intersectionality, the lived experiences of those communities referred to by such concepts, or the normative project for which intersectionality is the daily bread: black feminism (i.e. Combahee River Collective 1977; Lorde 1984; hooks 1984; Collins 1986). While my article was cynical about the growing epistemic commodification of intersectionality more generally, I am hopeful for new scholarship in the subfield. Recent studies of militarized masculinities, although not always using intersectionality directly, demonstrate hope for a radical transformation of the existing gendered, classed, and racial global order by politicizing which and when differences matter; why inequalities persist; and where military men and women are not equally recognised, posititioned or privileged. Some examples of this work include Richter-Monpetit (2016), Barkawi (2017); Burnett and Milani (2017), Ingelaere and Wilén (2017), Chisholm (2017), McCaffrey and Donohue (2017) Partis-Jennings (2017), Zalewski (2017), Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen (2018) and Myrttinen (2018). This work is situated within new epistemic assemblages which challenge the gendered, sexual, racial, and/or neoliberal systems of oppression by paying homage to the work of critical, radical, and political scholarship on heterosexism, colonialism, and capitalism (Ahmed 2013), or by simply taking up the task of smashing. There is no better moment for CMS scholars to do the same.

## Impacts

### Authoritarianism

#### Authoritarianism is a product of patriarchy—wielding authoritarian power becomes an exercise in masculinity and policy reforms merely make this patriarchy more sustainable

Enloe 17

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The fact that patriarchy is a term so many people shy away from using is one of the things that enables it to survive. Patriarchy is everyday sexism, but it is more than everyday sexism. Patriarchy embraces misogyny, but relies on more than misogyny. Patriarchy produces gender inequality, but its consequences run deeper than gender inequality. Patriarchy is a system—a dynamic web—of particular ideas and relationships. That system of interwoven ideas and relationships is not brittle; it is not static. Patriarchy can be updated and modernized. It is stunningly adaptable. That is the sense in which it is useful, I think, to talk about patriarchy as “sustainable.” Today, we think of “sustainability” as a positive thing, as a reference point with which to measure whether any practice or policy is worthy of our support. Thus the newest United Nations goals for international development are called the Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs” to UN insiders). To be positively sustainable, a project should meet more than short-term objectives; it should be designed for the long term. To be sustainable, an undertaking should eschew narrow self-interests, insteadproviding benefits for the widest possible constituency. To be sustain able, a policy should be earth-centric, not merely human-centric. • Planting cash crops dependent on soil-degrading chemicals is not sustainable. • Designing a transport system that continues to rely on fossil-fuel-guzzling automobiles and trucks is not sustainable. • Crafting a national development plan that raises the Gross National Product while widening the gap between the rich minority and the poor majority is not sustainable. • Negotiating a formula for ending a war that satisfies only the armed men at the table will not create a sustainable peace. Sustainability, however, is only as positive as the thing we choose to perpetuate. “Sustainable patriarchy” sounds odd, but it is not a contradiction in terms. It simply describes how a system of ideas and relationships that so many women have risked their reputations and lives to challenge has, nonetheless, managed to survive. Describing patriarchy’s stubborn survival and its remarkable adaptability is not to drape it in a mantle of unassailability. The concept of “sustainable patriarchy” is not intended to deepen despair or feed resignation. Quite the opposite. Exposing the ways patriarchal systems are being perpetuated today will enable us to more effectively challenge and dismantle them. The ideas and relationships that comprise any patriarchal system are multiple, but knowable. They are not mysterious. They are not abstracted from daily life. Patriarchy is what we live. Patriarchal ideas include both beliefs (that is, how we explain how the world works) and values (what we deem is worthy, good, attractive, as well as what we find unworthy, bad, distasteful). Both can be appealing—and in fact are appealing, not only to most men, but to a lot of women. That appeal is one of the things that sustains it. When we explore what persuaded so many American women to vote for Trump in the 2016 presidential election—or to support conservative parties in Britain, Poland, Chile, Japan, or Australia —we should think seriously about the appeals and rewards of patriarchy for diverse women. Patriarchal beliefs include understandings about whether sex is fixed at birth, whether gender is synonymous with sex, whether women and men are “naturally” different, whether maleness is inherently rational, while femaleness is inherently emotional. Patriarchal beliefs also include understandings about whether humans of different races are “naturally” ranked in a hierarchy, whether the core elements of human societies are biological families, and whether the world is a dangerous place that necessitates men acting as the protectors of women. Patriarchal beliefs include, as well, potent notions of fate and inevitability. A shrug of one’s shoulders can express a belief. In other words, our beliefs are how we go about making sense of our complex surroundings and the wider universe in which we live. For instance, current arguments about transgender people and about climate change have starkly exposed deeply held conflicting beliefs. Likewise, learning only now, fifty years after their achievements, that African American women mathematicians were crucial players in the creation of the US space program can be unnerving to many people.31 Perhaps our surprise when we learn this history reveals that, until now, we had believed that Black women did not have the capabilities to master advanced mathematics. Patriarchal values are supported by patriarchal beliefs, but are intended more explicitly to steer behavior. Thus we tend to make values the topics of our debates among friends, families, and political parties, even if it is our differing beliefs that ignite the deepest conflicts with each other. Among the patriarchal values that have been most contentious are those assigning more worth to reason than to emotion, those which bestow inherent worth on traditions, and those which prioritize family loyalty over all other sorts of commitment. To rank governments on the basis of whether they are militarily sophisticated and paternalistically authoritarian towards their citizens also demonstrates our absorption of patriarchal values. Patriarchal values often include admiration for what are imagined to be manly forms of leadership, and, as a patriarchal complement, admiration chiefly for women who devote themselves first and foremost to mothering. Thus, to anyone embracing such patriarchal values, hearing Liberian Leymah Gbowee praised for her successful mobilization of the Liberian women’s peace movement, without any reference to her behavior as a wife or a mother, can feel uncomfortable. Authoritarian values are commonly thought to characterize leaders who themselves aspire to be authoritarian in their own wielding of power. Across many cultures, leaders’ authoritarian inclinations are intertwined with their presumed manliness. Contempt for femininity—even while showing off one’s “winning way with women”—is often coupled with masculinized authoritarian leadership. This insight is notable in feminist explorations of authoritarianism. No continent or culture has a monopoly on authoritarian leaders. Zimbabwe’s president, Robert Mugabe, has often been described as a proto-typical authoritarian ruler. Egypt’s former general and current president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and China’s president, Xi Jinping, may sit on top of quite dissimilar state systems, but both exhibit distinctly authoritarian modes of leadership. So too does Russian president Vladimir Putin and his Middle East ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.32 In 2017, Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, held a national referendum which narrowly passed a constitutional amendment that in effect enabled him to wield state power in a more authoritarian manner. Of course, women who become leaders can absorb and advocate for authoritarian values, though the gendered credentials are distinctive. One thinks of Margaret Thatcher and Indira Gandhi. Both women were admired for their allegedly masculinized skills. “The only man in the room,” according to each of their male admirers. Many American Women’s March participants voiced alarm at Donald Trump’s apparent efforts to transform the US presidency into an authoritarian post. They saw evidence of his valuing a sort of leadership that was dismissive of the presidency’s relationships with co-equal legislative and court branches. He appeared to value a sort of masculinized authority that would not be constrained by the deliberately complex system of American constitutionalism. To accept such structural constraints, in his mind, it seemed, bordered on becoming feminized. It is a mistake, however, to think of authoritarian values as adhering just to a certain kind of leader. Authoritarian values are embraced by those men and women far from the centers of power who, nonetheless, admire the type of manly leader who presents himself as “strong.” That is, among its followers, authoritarianism can take the form of submissiveness. The iconic version of masculinized submission to an authoritarian leader is the “loyal lieutenant.” But there are other masculinized versions as well: the fawning courtier, the self-interested crony, theaspiring wannabe, the proverbial “foot soldier.” To be an authoritarian voter is to be someone—of any gender—who yearns for a manly man (or a suitably masculinized woman) to take firm hold on the reins of power and sweep away all the frustrating complexities of constitutional checks and balances. Such a voter hopes that this leader will eschew the time-consuming give-and-take of democratic debate and compromise. To absorb authoritarian values in one’s role as citizen fosters admiration for a leader who dismisses the constraints of law and the messiness that is the characteristic of a genuinely open public arena. Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Donald Trump have each had their fervent admirers, even when those admirers do not garner direct benefits from that leader’s rule. Though they might imagine themselves to be defiantly individualistic, these admirers are authoritarian in both the values they espouse and the relationships in which they take comfort. Values and beliefs often capture our attention more readily than patriarchal relationships. Patriarchal relationships have to be minutely observed over time. That calls for stamina, patience, and attentiveness. Patriarchal relationships are hard to reveal in a snapshot and only occasionally appear on a formal organizational chart—X reports to Y, while Z has the power to promote or fire Y. Most lived relationships are nuanced. They are made visible not just through speeches, memos, minutes, punches, gunshots, or exchanges of cash—though trackingeach of these can be revealing. Relationships are charted by taking careful note of small gestures, unrecorded silences, and little-noticed absences. The artful rendition of relationships has drawn thousands of readers to the novels of Jane Austen and Elena Ferrante. That is why we binge watch House of Cards and The Crown. To say that patriarchy has proved remarkably adaptable is not to argue that there have been no significant successes in challenging it. Patriarchy would not need to constantly adapt if those anti-patriarchal successes had not been achieved. The forcing of men by women to accept their casting ballots on equal terms with men, in countries as different as Sweden, South Africa, and Brazil, has compelled patriarchal men and women to find new ways to ensure the privileging of masculinity in governance. Similarly, women in countries as disparate as Samoa, Turkey, and Britain who have managed to drag the practice of wife-beating out of the domestic shadows, and compel reluctant governments to treat it as a crime, have motivated patriarchy’s adherents to craft new strategies for intimidating women. It has been this combination of feminist achievement and patriarchy’s adaptability that has required women’s movements across the world to keep reinventing themselves. To grapple with an adaptable patriarchy takes time, energy, and ever more diverse alliances. Patriarchy’s beneficiaries count on us getting tired. Patriarchal systems—those dynamic webs of beliefs, values, and relationships—have to be able to adapt in ways that make them look new, reformed, “up-to-date,” occasionally even revolutionary. Their advocates have to perform these repeated facelifts while sustaining patriarchy’s essential core: the privileging of particular forms of masculinity over despised masculinities and over all forms of femininity. A few select women can be let into the boardroom—or onto the television sportscast or into the law school—but on (usually unwritten and denied) conditions: that those few women do not insist that many more women of diverse races join them; that those allowed inside internalize masculinized ways of thinking (about profits, war, sexuality, inequality); or, by contrast, that those few selected women act out a form of patriarchal femininity that complements but does not supplant masculinized privilege. There is an alternative process for perpetuating patriarchal beliefs, values, and relationships, which is to turn what used to be a site of masculinized privilege into a site of feminized marginalization. The classic example is bank clerking. In Dickens’s time, to be a bank clerk was to be a respectable manly man with a foot on the lower rung of the patriarchal ladder; by the early twenty-first century, bank clerking has become feminized and the ladder leads nowhere.33 Similarly, the anchoring of television news programs used to be an exclusively male job. It, too, has been feminized in many countries in ways that have sucked much of the authority out of the position. Likewise, military male commanders deciding that certain once-masculinized roles could be feminized, without risking the reputation of the military as a site for men to prove their manliness, is as old as uniformed female soldiers serving as secretaries for male officers. Recently, for example, the US military has taken steps to replace male soldiers with female soldiers at war zone checkpoints. Women are under-represented in all but two of the world’s national legislatures, those of Bolivia and Rwanda.34 They are making gains, however, at the same time as many governments, in the name of “anti-terrorism,” are investing more power in their security officials. It may not be fantastical, then, to wonder if one day elected legislators will become so powerless that patriarchs will encourage the feminization of legislatures, while real power will be wielded by men (and a few select women) occupying masculinized posts atop the treasury, the military, and the security and intelligence agencies.

### Language

#### Gendered language sustains patriarchy—it conceals gendered violence to prop up patriarchal systems

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It is worth pausing here to take a second look at language. Independently from the practice of patriarchy, the very choice of language can perpetuate patriarchal beliefs. Commonly used by officials of international agencies and governments, as well as by staffers of nongovernmental human rights and humanitarian aid organizations, many of whom are dedicated to improving girls’ and women’s lives, this familiar phrase, “child marriages,” may be helping to sustain patriarchy. How does this work? “Child marriages” implies that boys as well as girls are offered up in marriage by their parents while they are still minors. This is true. However, by adopting the phrase “child marriages” one is suggesting that boys are just as likely as girls to be married while still in their childhood, and this is not true. For instance, researchers for UNICEF concluded, in their detailed 2016 report A Study on Early Marriage in Jordan, 2014, that, among both Jordanian children and Syrian refugee children living in Jordan, less than even one half of one percent of the children married were boys. That is, in reality, these are not “child marriages.” They are girl marriages. Each of us helps to sustain patriarchal ideas and practices when we hide the workings of gendered inequities behind a curtain of ungendered language. And, when we hide patriarchy, we are sustaining it.

### Violence

#### Military masculinity causes violence—pathological violence becomes an assertion of masculinity

Partis-Jennings 17 (Hannah Partis-Jennings research focuses on gender, performance, and spatial practice in liberal peace paradigms and her PhD, from the University of St Andrews, focused specifically on Afghanistan where she conducted field research in 2014, “Military Masculinity and the Act of Killing in Hamlet and Afghanistan.” Men and Masculinities. 2019; 22(2): 254-272. doi:10.1177/1097184X17718585) -SAJ

A key factor that polices military masculinity is the possibility of gendered shame befalling those who cannot live up to a masculine ideal. The word shame is indebted 10 Men and Masculinities XX(X) to terms meaning “to cover, to veil, to hide” which is indicative of its impact on individuals (Pattison 2000, 40). When shamed, we physically and mentally withdraw. We feel undone, cripplingly self-conscious, debilitating aware of our own perceived inadequacy, and totally unable to manage the impact of that awareness (p. 41). Crucially, shame is so viscerally and emotionally powerful that it shuts down cognition. Shame is anathema to considered thought, to processes of thinking, and therefore to moral deliberation. Moreover, shame gathers momentum, if reiterated and referred to habitually, and in cultural discourse, it can produce a sustained feeling of urgency. There is a need to rectify the imbalance felt in ones sense of self, to eliminate shame via “hyperbolic displays of agency” manifesting in aggression or violence (Mann 2014, 41, 117). Nussbaum (2004) and Jordan (1989) note that shame denies the possibility of empathy. Mann goes a step further and argues that in order to banish shame, there is a need to humiliate others, to practice violence upon them in order to reassert the broken sense of self (2014, 117, 124). Shame taps into the deepest roots of identity structures, and therefore, unsurprisingly, it can have strongly gendered implications and causes. Feminist scholars have pointed to the role of basic military training in generating gendered shame (Goldstein 2001; Whitworth 2004). If a male soldier is perceived as weak, failing, or overly thoughtful, he is associated with the feminine. He is a “pussy,” a “faggot,” a “little bitch” (Mann 2014, 212). His gendered identity becomes vulnerable, the notion of the feminine becomes a weapon, which can disrupt his most personal sense of self-worth. In the audio recording of the Marine A incident, the soldiers refer to their enemy as a “cunt,” an expletive which, similar to “fuck” (also used by the soldiers), has a specifically gendered connotation (McKinnon 1989, 4). This word seems to function as the visceral expression of disgust at the feminine; the attempt to expel or purge the female, for the soldiers to force gendered shame upon the enemy Other. Mann argues that shame in the masculine domain provokes the feminization of others in an attempt for the shamed subject(s) to recover their sense of self (2014). The actions of Marine A can therefore be understood as a product of gendered shame, abstracted through the cultural and behavioral framework of military training and practice (Sasson-Levy 2003). A gendered “shame-to-power conversion”4 (Mann 2014, 131–40) by the soldiers is visible in the feminizing and killing of the injured Afghan insurgent; Marine A manifests the desire to control his identity in an uncontrollable context, to regain agency by denying agency to the Other, shaming him, dehumanizing him, committing violence against him, and in doing so striving to regain some semblance of the promised military masculine power (Mann 2014; Richter-Montpetit 2007; Welland 2013). Scholars have pointed out that behavioral expectations generated by military masculinities are becoming disconnected from actual soldiering tasks. As RichterMontpetit argues, citing Whitworth, this disconnect renders masculine identities in the military “inherently fragile.” There are “discrepancies between the myth/ promise-fueled expectations fostered in military training on the one hand, and the Partis-Jennings 11 unstable and uncontrollable reality of war on the other” (Richter-Montpetit 2007, 45). Duncanson writes about peacekeeper masculinity as a modification of the traditional military masculine framework to include more previously feminized tasks (2013, 95). Similarly, Welland (2013) argues that asexuality and discipline are hard won myths through which the homosocial behavior and feminized tasks of soldiering are obfuscated. These frameworks signal the adaptation of masculine identity structures in the face of the shifting conduct and requirements of war that often include peace-related activities and population engagement (Duncanson 2013; Paris 2013). However, there is an inherent tension in the ability of individuals to adapt to “softer” tasks (like peacekeeping) and to reconcile their ideas and expectations about militarized masculine practice with the situations they find themselves in and the tasks they perform (Duncanson 2013; Welland 2013). There is often a sense that soldiers are trained to be masculine and then paradoxically expected to carry out feminized activities (Welland 2013). The military masculinities which Mann (2014, 125) argues are fostered in basic training through gendered shaming require an outlet, yet the possibilities for banishing this shame through demonstrations of military masculinity are becoming more restricted and more confused in the modern, hybridized, and regulated military climate. Violent outbursts are hardly pathological in this context, but the logical corollary of the logic of war which relies on contradictions, psychological pressures, and Othering (Welland 2013). The relationship between gendered shame, acts of violence/killing (such as in the Marine A case), and military masculinity can be further elucidated by looking at the parallels between this context and Hamlet’s. The notion of femininity is deeply connected to ideas around shame, humiliation, and original sin in Hamlet (Adelman 1992). For Adelman, what Hamlet battles in the text is the shameful “subjection of male to female” inherent in his inability to act decisively, and she argues that the whole story is centered on combatting the contamination of the feminine. This echoes Cohn and Weber’s point that military praxis requires a “purging of the feminine” (Cohn 1999, 462). Thus, the aesthetic of gendered shame and preemptive gender crisis that Hamlet demonstrates offers an insightful parallel into the dangerous psychological consequences of the required “shame-to-power conversion” in military masculinities (Mann 2014, 131–40). Through this aesthetic lens, pathological acts of violence committed by soldiers can be seen as a way of trying to regain ownership of the gendered self; an attempt to banish shame and the linked possibility of being contaminated by femininity. The Marine A incident might not have been understood as gendered, but as mentioned above, one of the justifications for his actions offered by a fellow soldier was that the British feel feminized and weak in Afghanistan and must try to emulate or equal what he called “Taliban masculinity” (Terrill 2014). These gendered parallels between Marine A and Hamlet thus require us to contemplate the effects of institutional destabilization of gender identity and of forcing soldiers to prove their gender and thus selfhood, according to the unattainable and unrealistic parameters characteristic of the logic of war.

#### Reinforcing masculinity makes violence a necessity—war becomes an inevitable to assert the masculine hero image

Partis-Jennings 17 (Hannah Partis-Jennings research focuses on gender, performance, and spatial practice in liberal peace paradigms and her PhD, from the University of St Andrews, focused specifically on Afghanistan where she conducted field research in 2014, “Military Masculinity and the Act of Killing in Hamlet and Afghanistan”, The Author(s), 6/13/2017, <https://www.dropbox.com/s/1s9c3hhlyfkvhmm/Partis-Jennings%20%282017%29%20-%20Military%20Masculinity%20and%20the%20Act%20of%20Killing%20in%20Hamlet%20and%20Afghanistan.pdf?dl=0> pg.13)-SAJ

In Hamlet , there is a particular power associated with the performance of mur- der—Hamlet arranges a play version of his father’s murder in order to confirm his suspicions about the culprits—but it is also a display of bravado. The play is the means through which Hamlet makes Claudius afraid, through which he tries to demonstrate his capacity to avenge his father like a real man. Performance here is gendered; Hamlet uses theatricality to demonstrate and justify his own capacity and desire to kill and to fulfill his gendere d filial duty (Shakespeare 2007, 1952– 56). The video/audio recording of Marine A shooting t he insurgent is also notable for its theatricality. Not only is the use o f the Shakespeare quote performative in and of itself, but the whole scene demonstrates a strange staginess. This was noted in the BBC documentary where one marin e commented that Marine A was putting on an act of bravado highly common in the context of war. He suggested that it is an “air of drama that comes with command a bit of bravado” (Terrill 2014).Arguably, the performance of hypermasculine aggression and callous detachment is a mechanism for leadership in the military, a way to show those in your command that gender is on your side, and that like a real military man, you have the situation under control. Performance is an undertheorized but vital component of warfare (see Higate and Henry 2009), and the fact that Hamlet uses a theatrical production to frighten his enemy resonates with modern war practice. Mann (2014) points out that soldiers often fight because they are embarrassed not to be seen as brave and masculine in a gendered theatre. Performance is vital for attempting to display masculine bravado, to banish fear through pretense and drama, and thus is significant first at the individual level, yet also by its very nature transcends this level of significance. An examination of performativity is a central tenet of meaning within an aesthetic methodology and intertextual analysis. Bauman and Briggs state that performances move various discursive components “into a reflexive arena where they can be examined critically” (1990, 60). Thus, “performative infrastructure” (particularly in war) is the locus where “meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established”; yet on a more universal scale, it also allows for “political and ethical outcomes [to be]... made more or less possible” (Bialasiewicz et al. 2007: 406, 415). Hamlet uses performance to move his father’s murder from suspicion to reality, from internal to public, and from personal to political (the play is staged in the Royal Court); “[p]erformance puts the act of speaking on display—objectifies it, lifts it to a degree from its interactional setting and opens it to scrutiny by an audience” (Bauman and Briggs 1990, 73). The act of violence committed by Marine A was made visible by the accidental recording on his fellow soldier’s head camera and remains visible through media representation and online advocacy such as the website JFMA.5 These mediated performances of killing are defined by the masculine aesthetic of war. The performance of murder in Hamlet is meta-theatrical, meaning it is a play within a play and equally the audio recording of the incident functions as a performance, a piece of drama available for public consumption yet it simultaneously exists within the wider performance of a nation at war. Thus, even as a singular act, it must necessarily signal the deeply political, structurally gendered consequences of states anctioned killing. If the audio recording on YouTube is understood as a play within a play, the politically constituted framing of war is the larger piece of gendered aesthetics and theatricality (Mann 2006). The citational expression, evoking Hamlet, contributes to a particular aesthetic event and “aesthetic events register a double moment, which, at its most basic, is both a destabilizing aesthetic or performative experience where thought is made strange to itself and a moment of reflection on the aesthetic, political or ethical consequences of this experience” (L. Frost 2010, 436). The combined performativity of the Hamlet quote and the framing of Marine A’s fate as tragic on the website JFMA evoke a heroic military masculinity through a tragic aesthetic. Aristotle argues in the Poetics that a tragic hero provokes pity and fear, pity because of this tragic fate and fear because his fate could have belonged to any other (Erskine and Lebow 2012, 3). JFMA seeks to draw upon the pity and fear that resonate with a tragic aesthetic by portraying Marine A as a kind of heroic everyman. He is a masculine character, and his love of sport (a manly pursuit) particularly rugby and swimming (in which he achieved a “life-saving certificate”) is hugely emphasized; he is depicted as normal guy with a mum and dad, who loves his nieces and nephews and squeezes in a round of golf when he can. Equally, his extraordinary military masculine heroism is highlighted on the JFMA Facebook page,6 which proclaims slogans such as “Never Was So Much Owed By So Many” and “He Put His Life on the Line for Us” in posters of Marine A. JFMA seeks to emphasize in the Marine A incident, the presence of an impossible ethical choice as set out by the core of a tragic dilemma. The home page of the website has only one sentence of content text: “Sgt Alexander Blackman has been sentenced to 8 years to life for allegedly killing a Taliban insurgent who moments before was trying to kill him and the men under his command.” Implicit in this sentence is the same sentiment expressed by those who commented under the YouTube audio: war is war and the ethics of life and death are not the same in war. Erskine and Lebow suggest that “an appreciation of tragedy . . . has the potential to inform our thinking about the perceived dilemmas that arise in war when there appear to be multiple, conflicting obligations and, therefore, no obvious right course of action” (2012, 11). JFMA taps into this idea, reiterating the notion of the fog of war and the allegiance of a soldier to his country as legitimizing action that may otherwise be understood as wrongful killing. A central ethical difference between Greek and Shakespearean tragedy is the reduction of the role of fate and the centrality of individual moral responsibility in the latter (Erskine and Lebow 2012, 5). Even as Hamlet, just as JFMA’s narrative, “illustrates how complex and contradictory the ethical imperatives that make their demands on us are,” it is this personal moral responsibility for killing which paralyses Hamlet as he contemplates his enemy’s humanity (M. Frost 2012, 31). The question of moral responsibility starkly pursued through a murder trial and judgment destabilizes the tragic aesthetic of JFMA and those who support Marine A as a militarized masculine hero killing bravely in the name of war, yet they also make the story a tragic narrative in the first place by signaling seemingly incompatible ethical frameworks (civilian law and war time actions). The aesthetic lens through which Marine A and Hamlet are linked across worlds brings to bear a contemplation of wider complicity in Marine A’s actions, confronting the public domain with its own framing, marking the killing as a political act, and elucidating the fact that “what is considered legitimate and controlled violence, or illegitimate and uncontrolled violence is not always so ‘neat’” (Welland 2013, 899). It is evident in the words of the YouTube comments, the JFMA website, and supporter sentiments in the BBC documentary that military masculinity provides a safe space through which to rationalize death, killing, and relational vulnerability, to make it easier to consume a moment of ethical confusion and violence brought about through the actions of a legitimate state at war. The depiction of Marine A as a tragic masculine hero is both inverted and supported by the most direct reference to a tragic hero in the entire incident—an intertextual evocation of Hamlet who is perhaps one of culture’s most famous tragic heroes. In other words, this evocation shines a light on both Marine A’s lack of ethical contemplation and inhumanity and the fundamentally difficult, violence-oriented conditions and mode of interpretation in which his act is situated, in which we are all complicit and for which he alone cannot be to blame. This citational instant draws both parallels and distinctions that are gendered and relational, rendering a killing in Afghanistan visible in a different light through an aesthetic lens and equally illustrating that it has wider gendered and political significance.

## Alt

### Solvency – Epistemology

#### Feminist interventions in IR are key to breaking down binaries that cause conflict and decolonizing knowledge itself within academic settings

McLeod & O’Reilly 19

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Critical PCS comes under fire for reinforcing binaries – such as local/international; everyday/exceptional; male/female – and for perpetuating hierarchies between lay/ expert forms of knowledge. The articles in this special issue of Peacebuilding all draw on feminist theory, epistemology, and/or methodology to highlight their implications for how we might critically analyse and reflect upon peacebuilding practice. One key insight is that feminist approaches open the way for a less binary, more nuanced approach to PCS. Stefanie Kappler and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert explore this in relation to hybridity, the everyday, and narratives – key areas of PCS research which may reaffirm binaries and power hierarchies if approached without care. Kappler and Lemay-Hébert introduce an ‘intersectionality of peace’ approach to prompt a broader understanding of power relations as they are lived and experienced on the ground by a variety of actors (including researchers and peacebuilding interveners). They show that feminist understandings of intersectionality, firstly, enable an exploration of hybrid identities without (re)producing common dichotomies; secondly, allow the complex power dynamics operating within everyday dimensions of peacebuilding interventions to be unpacked; and, finally, support an approach to narrative analysis which identifies structural inequalities. This has implications for how we analyse peace in theory and practice, pushing us to overcome rigid binaries (such as local/international, us/them, male/female), and to challenge discursive and material structures of domination which pervade (post-)conflict settings. One reason that feminist perceptions help to destabilise binary boundaries the emphasis of feminist research practice upon reflexivity.88 Feminist researchers recognise that ‘the selection of research questions and . . . the development of (new) research practices’ are among the areas ‘where feminist insights can make their biggest impact’.89 In this Special Issue, Catherine Baker explores how young people engage with popular music in Croatia, Rachel Julian, Berit Bliesemann de Guevara and Robin Redhead examine artistic expressions of silenced voices in Myanmar, and Hannah PartisJennings asks questions about the manifestations of the ‘third-gender’ in Afghanistan. These articles, and others in this Special Issue, emphasise emancipatory and participatory forms of research across a range of very different post-conflict contexts. Such approaches allow researchers to break down barriers between private and public aspects of peace. They enable scholars to tap into voices, culture and community that often remain hidden or unappreciated by existing approaches to PCS, and can introduce everyday experiences of conflict and peace that are not frequently captured. By recentring on ideas about emancipation and participation, feminist methodologies can be deployed to subvert and address gendered power relations shaping the practice of research in PCS. Key to the self-reflexivity of feminist research is to raise ‘new ethical and political dilemmas that expand methodological inquiry’.90 Again, all the articles in the Special Issue do this in one way or another. In particular, Julian et al explore the effects of methodological choice in their investigation of the ‘Raising Silent Voices’ project in Myanmar. They note that feminist epistemology prompted them to foreground the experiential knowledge of ‘ordinary people’ in conflict situations. Such knowledge, they contend, is essential for understanding the social world and should be placed at centre of analysis. The authors demonstrate how experiential knowledge can be gathered with arts-based methodologies. In doing so, they highlight the importance of knowledge about conflict/peace being produced from standpoint of women and marginalised others whose experiences are so often written out. They argue that this involves reworking and contesting hierarchical power relations between ‘researched’ and ‘researcher’. In recognising that knowledge is produced intersubjectively, the authors note the importance of ‘raising silent voices’ (and indeed of the silence) of those who have experienced war. In doing so, they make a compelling case for the value of feminist insights for PCS research. Embodiment, experience and sensory perceptions Feminism has much to offer in terms of understanding that spaces between conflict and peace are all lived, embodied experiences. A key contribution of feminism to critical PCS is the nuanced sensory perception that feminist analysis offers. This arises out of several key feminist insights about the personal, about bodies, and about experience. While not all feminist work explicitly refers to senses, sensory perceptions shape feminist research, analysis and writing. This is because making sense of the human social experience requires us to draw on bodily senses. We cannot know about the world without seeing, hearing, touching, smelling or tasting. Senses are crucial data for perceiving the world, and how you use your senses affects how you interact and make sense of the world. Realising that senses are data is a powerful realisation: data are bits of information that we put together – but how do we access that information? Through our senses. Likewise, processes of conflict and peace are encountered/perceived through the senses – indeed, the common phrases used to describe war refer to senses, e.g. the cry for war/peace; sight of suffering; touch of violence/care; smell of death/disease; the taste of victory (sweet) or defeat (bitter). This means that developing a nuanced sensory perception of the world is crucial to better understanding the processes and practice of international peacebuilding. Catherine Baker, in this Special Issue, explores how young people engage with (listen to, sing) popular music in post-conflict Croatia to provide insights into how understandings of everyday peace are contested. By exploring how gendered and racialised constructs are attached to and detached from material bodies within audio-visual media, she shows how feminist and aesthetic approaches can help critical PCS reach a deeper understanding of the affective politics of post-conflict masculinities. Sensory explorations are a powerful reminder of how the personal is political: apparently personal, private, ‘merely’ social aspects of daily life (such as popular music heard and listened to by teenagers) are ‘in fact infused with power’ and so are intensely political.91 There are important connections to be made between sensory perceptions, bodies and experience, which may open the way for a more nuanced analysis within PCS. Feminist scholars make gendered bodies and corporeality central to critical PCS. This begins from the premise that it is necessary to avoid adding ‘women’ as an essentialised category to analyses of peace and conflict. Rather, as noted earlier, gender as an analytical category needs to be contextualised, conceptualised and analysed in all its messy, glorious complexity. The contributions in this Special Issue do this in various ways. Tarja Väyrynen argues against abstract and theoretical understandings of peace, pointing to the significance of vulnerability and corporeality in comprehending how peace is expressed through situated, embodied encounters. Tiina Vaittinen, Amanda Donahoe, Rahel Kunz, Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir and Sanam Roohi suggest that placing feminist understandings of care and of everyday peace at the forefront of critical PCS debates on the ‘local turn’ would significantly expand understandings of how peace emerges in theory and practice. Vaittinen et al spotlight the vital contributions offered by gendered relations of care and of caring towards the construction of everyday peace. As they show, these relations are invaluable, yet are frequently neglected by critical analyses of peace. The articles by Väyrynen and by Vaittinen et al demonstrate that corporeality can give greater texture and depth to the role that gendered power relations play in the shift towards ‘post-liberal peace’. The feminist interest in corporeality has no doubt emerged out of a wariness ‘of any attempts to link women’s subjectivities and social positions to the specifics of their bodies’.- 92 As noted earlier in this introduction, critical PCS tends to view gender as a problem, or an issue to solve (rather than a critical lens on the world). A feminist perspective about corporeality enables us to think about how bodies have an ability to ‘extend the frameworks which contain them’.93 The ramifications of this insight is powerfully made in this Special Issue by Hannah Partis-Jennings, who explores the use of the ‘third gender’ by international peacebuilders working in Afghanistan. By developing a framework of gendered hybridity, Partis-Jennings demonstrates how bodies and performances of female internationals adopting and/or assigned the category of the third gender, is central to understanding how actors perform and shape peace promotion at the everyday level. This article is a valuable addition to a growing body of scholarship on hybridity – which highlights how a feminist perspective can prompt a more complex set of questions about the gendered dynamics between local and international actors and how that shapes and produces gender in the practice and process of post-conflict reconstruction.94 Decolonising the concepts and methods of PCS Critical scholarship has been criticised for its propensity to recreate rather than adequately challenge the hierarchies, binaries, and exclusions of mainstream scholarship.95 Bennett and Watson, for example, note ‘a lack of real engagement’ with local stakeholders plus a failure of ‘white middle class Western researchers’ to reflect on their positionality and privilege and its impact on relationships with research participants.96 Sabaratnam highlights a tendency to disregard or downplay the agency and subjectivity of societies and communities targeted by liberal interventionism, despite critical scholars claiming to search for ‘local’, ‘everyday’, or ‘subaltern’ understandings of peace.97 There is an urgent need to decolonise PCS research by challenging neo-colonial modes of knowledge production. We do not claim that feminist scholarship has entirely escaped Eurocentric assumptions. We acknowledge that the authors in this Special Issue are in the main white scholars situated in the Global North. Furthermore, as Heidi Hudson points out, ‘the exploration of gender and decoloniality in relation to peacebuilding remains underrepresented and undertheorised, with the literature focussed on gender and coloniality generally’.98 Nevertheless, we contend that feminist scholarship is an invaluable source for critical scholars engaging with many of the difficult theoretical issues, methodological challenges, and ethical dilemmas involved in undertaking ‘decolonial’ research. Feminist research aims to build ‘non-exploitative relationships within research’ by paying attention to the significance of gender whilst attending to the intersections between sexism, racism, heteronormativity, classism, and so on.99 Central to this is the understanding that research relationships are shot through with dynamic, shifting, yet hierarchical relations of power.100 Thinking about the complexity of power relations in relation to gender and decoloniality is crucial for thinking about ‘local’ and ‘everyday’ in analyses of peacebuilding. Making sense of how to use global peacebuilding architectures (such as the WPS resolutions) in local contexts requires us to draw upon feminist ideas about the local, the everyday, and lived experience.101 Feminists have long argued that ‘gender analysis offers a bottom-up foundational logic’ which may counter the ways that liberal peacebuilding projects masks disparities between a range of civil society actors.102 Building on these ideas, in this Special Issue, Tarja Väyrynen draws on a long heritage of feminist peace research about everyday embodied experiences to develop a construct of ‘eventness’. Through ‘eventness’ she highlights how to bring peace back to the lives of ordinary people, seeking to expose the radical potential embedded in the everyday by recognising the spectacular within the ordinary. Part of decolonising PCS includes considering the ways that scholarship and research practices continue to perpetuate the colonial and Eurocentric nature of academia itself.103 This awareness was especially heightened around the ‘Sapphire Series’ panels at the International Studies Association (ISA) annual conference in 2015, where the showpiece panels created by ISA were all-white scholars situated in the Global North.104 Feminist approaches to research and scholarship can support decolonising the academy. To achieve this, researchers often ‘engage creative strategies and a range of traditional and contemporary media as resources through which the subaltern speaks in varied social and community contexts’.105 In this Special Issue, the articles by Julian et al, Väyrynen, and Baker all do this via making use of the visual arts to ‘raise silent voices’, personal vignettes to highlight the significance of the mundane, and audio-visual media taken from a video-sharing website to problematise masculinities. As noted, the very practice of academic scholarship also needs decolonising. Feminists have sought to address this. One article in this Special Issue – by Vaittinen et al – was the product of Feminist Peace Research Network meetings organised by the Universities of Tampere, Lund and Tromsø during 2016–17.106 This international, interdisciplinary network brings together feminist PCS researchers from both Global South and North, as well as from academic and practitioner backgrounds. One of the network’s innovative practices was to group participants with similar research interests from across the Global North and South to develop a co-authored paper.107 The impetus behind this was to build a research network celebrating diverse lived experiences and to strengthen collaborations across research communities. Both critical and feminist PCS scholars might develop similar collaborative research practices in order to democratise knowledge production within PCS and challenge institutions and practices that maintain injustice.

### Solvency – IR

#### The alt is key—feminist analysis of peace and conflict is key to nuanced understanding of geopolitics

McLeod & O’Reilly 19 (Laura McLeod & Maria O’Reilly, Laura McLeod is a lecturer in International Politics at the University of Manchester, UK. Her research on gender, feminism and security in post-con fl ict ex-Yugoslavia has been published in International Studies Quarterly, Security Dialogue, International Feminist Journal of Politics , and Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Maria O’Reillyis a lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Leeds Beckett University,UK. Her research focuses on questions of gender, agency, justice, and security in conflict andpost-conflict contexts. Maria’s work has been published in International Feminist Journal of Politics, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, and Cooperation and Conflict, “Critical peace and conflict studies: feminist interventions”, Peacebuilding, 7:2, 127-145, DOI: 10.1080/21647259.2019.1588457) -SAJ

While defining ‘feminist PCS research’ is contentious, and indeed, there are various ways and extents to which scholarship can be feminist, we take the view that feminist PCS research seeks to develop and apply feminist theory and/or methodology to produce insights about issues of peace and conflict. Feminist approaches, while varied, understand gender as a concept or category that must be unpacked and engaged with to make sense of why conflict emerges and how peace can/should be built. Feminist PCS shares many commonalities with critical PCS scholarship, as we outline below.2 Both represent alternative approaches to the positivist research agenda that dominates mainstream PCS. Like critical PCS, feminist PCS research aims to achieve positive social change, by critiquing dominant ideologies and methodologies of building peace that (re)produce inequalities of power along lines of gender, race/ethnicity, nationality, class, sexuality, dis/ability, and so on. Both schools tend towards bottom-up methodologies that place lived experience at the centre of the research process. However, unlike critical scholarship, feminist PCS research is characterised by an explicitly feminist commitment, firstly, to identify the androcentric nature of PCS, and, secondly, to challenge the tendency of mainstream and critical PCS researchers to ignore, minimise, or marginalise the perspectives of women, girls, and non-binary people, and/or the category of gender in their analyses. That said, it is impossible to talk of ‘critical PCS’ and ‘feminist PCS’ as coherent entities that talk at odds with each other. We do not seek to develop a grand definition of what constitutes feminist or critical PCS – both are very diverse fields, and this is to be celebrated. Acknowledging that there is much slippage, in this Special Issue we aim to illustrate and make this slippage explicit, while demonstrating what is different when feminist scholars intervene in PCS. This introductory article proceeds in three parts. First, we unpack the key concepts underpinning this Special Issue, making explicit why we feel a feminist intervention is necessary. Second, we chart the connections between critical and feminist approaches to PCS, via an investigation of the ‘four generations’ of PCS scholarship.3 Our analysis highlights that: (a) the marginalisation of feminist ideas is a continual thread throughout the development of PCS, and (b) although the ‘fourth’ generation (critical PCS) has taken some inspiration from feminist scholars, there remain opportunities for deeper conversations. Third, we highlight the three key contributions that a feminist intervention into critical PCS achieves: (1) Feminist theory, epistemology and methodology is a rich resource, opening way for a less binary, more nuanced approach to PCS. (2) Feminist analysis encourages a nuanced sensory perception of peace and conflict, following several key feminist insights about the significance of the personal, of embodiment, and of experience. (3) Efforts to decolonise the modes of knowledge production within PCS cannot be fully realised without incorporating a feminist critique of concepts such as ‘the local’ and ‘the everyday’ which are currently at the heart of critical PCS scholarship. For us, these three reasons begin to address what is different when feminist scholars contend with issues of peace and conflict. These represent three key contributions of a feminist intervention into critical PCS, which is explored further throughout this Special Issue. Finally, the article concludes by outlining suggestions for how to foster a more effective dialogue between these fields. Feminism is provocative, and we do not want to pin it – feminism – down and define it. Sara Ahmed thinks of feminism as ‘homework’, because ‘we have so much to work out from not being at home in a world’ (2017, 7). As feminists, we do not always feel at ‘home’ within critical PCS. A paper about feminism presented at a conference sometimes leads to an awkward silence. Why? Sara Ahmed’s insight that ‘when you expose a problem you pose a problem’ comes to mind.4 Or perhaps it is because ‘nonfeminist scholars seem convinced that feminist knowledge does not concern them – a feeling reproduced by a common understanding that feminism is only about “identity politics” or “women’s stuff”’. 5 This provokes us to wonder if there has been a wilful blindness and marginalisation of the potential and actual contributions of feminist scholarship by many working in critical PCS. As stated, this Special Issue seeks to demonstrate that feminist approaches are vital to achieving a subtle and nuanced analysis of key issues in PCS. Paying serious attention to a wide range of feminist scholarship would highlight useful insights for peacebuilding policy and practice, make stronger efforts to decolonise PCS, and develop a nuanced sensory analysis within PCS scholarship. It is useful to distinguish between the terms women, gender, and feminism. It might seem obvious, but ‘women’ relates to a biological sex. ‘Gender’ typically refers to socially constructed understandings of bodies and how they behave. Gender is a contested and slippery concept. It may be best understood as a ‘category developed to explore what counts as “woman” and as “man”’. 6 Gender recognises that masculinity and femininity are culturally and socially constructed and are analytically different to categories such as male/female, boy/girl, which are (problematically) deployed to establish a sexual difference based upon bodily characteristics. Like gender, ‘feminism is tricky to define, and we do not wish to police what does or does not count as being feminist. Broadly, feminism may be understood as a political orientation and ideological movement geared towards the transformation of gendered power relations. These ideas about transformation are often informed by concepts such as inequality, patriarchy, misogyny, androcentricism, and sexism. ‘Intervention’ is a word that we use often in PCS. International intervention. Humanitarian intervention. Statebuilding interventions. Intervention can be understood as being intrusive. Marysia Zalewski notes that feminism’s presence in International Relations (IR) is an ‘explicitly gendered figure’, where the shape of arrival is seen as ‘an intruder’s knowledge’, where ‘feminism’s presence seemingly naturally requires explanation, justification and evaluation’. 7 Our experience is that PCS has been similar. We deliberately chose to title this Special Issue ‘Feminist Interventions’ because we wanted to intervene into a field stridently, and to point out what needed to be thought about differently. Our intervention is staged because we are concerned that there is a tendency within critical scholarship to engage with many concepts – hybridity, agency, the everyday, friction, the local, participation, and narratives – without paying attention to feminist insights. As the authors in this Special Issue demonstrate, many of these concepts have deep feminist roots, stretching back decades. These roots are rarely acknowledged. Additionally, throughout the Special Issue, authors have sought to demonstrate the ways in which feminist ideas can push us to rethink key concepts, approaches, and methods in contemporary PCS. It is not that feminism is a new approach to PCS, but rather, that the moment is ripe for a sustained feminist intervention, given the increasing use of popular concepts in critical PCS that have feminist roots.

### A2 Things Get Better

#### “The world is getting better” rhetoric is false and mystifies patriarchal structures which retrenches violence

Enloe 17

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It can be easy to slip into the sanguine notion that time itself creates positive change. Back then, systematic rape wasn’t considered a war crime. Back then, women journalists were relegated to the paper’s Style page. Back then, factory bosses could lock garment workers inside their unsafe factories. Phrasing it this way makes each change appear as though it didn’t take analyzing, organizing and risk-taking by scores of diverse women and their male allies in scores of different societies to achieve even small advances. All it took to roll back patriarchy was the mere passage of time. It is perhaps this optimism—a faith in the passage of time to create progress—that fueled my own too-easy presumption in 2013 that, after two decades of directing my attention elsewhere, when I revisited arenas in the globalized political economy I would find patriarchy in retreat. I was in for a surprise. Patriarchy is not reliant on just one or two attitudes that feminists have needed to challenge—for instance, that daughters are worth less parental investment than sons, or that men make better scientists than women—though, of course, those attitudes do indeed have to be altered if patriarchy is to be dismantled. Patriarchy is not even reliant on just a few relationships that feminists have had to transform—for example, men being given unlimited sexual access to their wives; or women being positioned in organizations as the loyal assistants to their male bosses. Though, again, transforming these patriarchal relationships has been a monumental task, which so many advocates of women’s rights have taken on their shoulders. Patriarchy is a particular complex web of both attitudes and relationships that position women and men, girls and boys in distinct and unequal categories, that value particular forms of masculinity over virtually all forms of femininity, and—and this is crucial—that ensure that men who fulfill these favored forms of manliness will be able to assert control over most women. In other words, patriarchy is wide and it is deep. It is distinct, but it feeds off both racism and classism. Patriarchy’s workings are not automatically rejected by women and girls. There are many rewards bestowed on a woman who finds ways to fit into a patriarchal system: marital economic security, societal respectability; even, occasionally, state honors. The woman who does not rebel against patriarchy will be complimented on her beauty, on her femininity, on her loyalty (as a daughter, a wife, a secretary); she will be praised for her endurance, her good sense, her domestic skills, her maternal devotion, her sexual appeal, her caring sacrifice, her patriotism. Patriarchy, precisely because it is woven out of so many ideas and sustained through such a plethora of intimate and formal relationships, is stubborn, while also surprisingly flexible. I have the original Hollywood poster here in my study. It was my brother, David, a 1940s movie buff, who found it. The poster announced Busby Berkeley’s 1943 film The Gang’s All Here. It was one of his over-the-top cinematic extravaganzas. Its release came during a brutalizing wartime. Most moviegoers were just clawing their way out of a deep economic depression. But in Busby Berkeley’s world it was all giant strawberries. David had hunted down the poster because he knew that I had become suddenly intrigued by the political roles played by the Brazilian actress and singer Carmen Miranda. By 1943 she had left Brazil, where she had become a radio and recording star, to dazzle audiences first on Broadway stages and then on Hollywood’s silver screen. Technicolor was made for her. There she is in the middle of the movie poster, strutting between phalanxes of giant strawberries. On her head is a plantation’s worth of bananas. This was the striking image splashed across the cover of Bananas, Beaches and Bases, where I started my journey to make feminist sense of international politics. I began doing the research that led to Bananas, Beaches and Bases in the late 1980s, after having already spent more than a decade investigating and teaching about racism in militaries, the comparative politics of women, and the politics of Southeast Asia. I wrote the manuscript specifically for the innovative small British feminist publisher Pandora Press. A year after its British publication (in 1989), Bananas was published in the United States, by the University of California Press. While I consciously wrote the book for a feminist trade press, it was after its publication in paperback by a well-known university press that it seemed to take off. Frankly, that took me by surprise. Looking back, I realize that it was the timing that was propitious. In the early 1990s, more women’s studies teachers were trying to internationalize their courses. Simultaneously, more teachers of international politics were beginning to explore the long-ignored gendered dynamics of those relationships. Bananas. It had taken me a surprisingly long time to think about bananas politically and internationally, and an even longer time to ask where were the women (and thus where were the men) in the global politics of bananas—and why? I say “surprising” because, for years, I had been in close proximity to other plantation crops. In Malaysia I had lived on the edge of a rubber plantation. In the coolness of the tropical mornings, I would watch the Malaysian Indian tappers as they emptied the latex-filled coconut cups tacked to the slim, dappled rubber trees. Just a few years earlier, Communist guerrillas had controlled this plantation, but by the mid-60s the latex was once again flowing and heading for the international market, where it would be turned by Dunlop into tennis balls and automobile tires. Five years later I was teaching a night-time class for a group of civil servants at Guyana’s national university. The campus was situated on the fringe of a sugar plantation. Large beetles flew through the open windows of our classroom, attracted by the light. This was in post-colonial Guyana. The multinational corporation Booker still owned most of Guyana’s sugar, though it was Guyanese Indian workers who performed the hard work of planting and harvesting the cane. Rubber and sugar. Tappers and cane workers. Dunlop and Booker. Malaysia and Guyana. For years, I thought about all of them without any gender curiosity. Race, ethnicity, class, nationality—those were the concepts that provided me with my analytical lenses. Each concept was— and has remained—crucial for making sense of the politics of rubber and sugar. Imagining plantation workers anywhere simply as “workers” will not yield reliable political explanations, much less forecasts. Yet, even when combined, these four complicating and clarifying concepts have turned out to be inadequate to explain the full workings of power that made and still make (and occasionally transform) the international politics of globalized plantation crops: rubber and sugar, as well as coffee, tea, pineapples, and palm oil. When I returned twenty years later to international banana politics as I was writing a revised and updated Bananas, Beaches and Bases, some of the political players were strikingly the same: Chiquita (formerly United Fruit), Dole and Del Monte; the government officials of the United States, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Colombia, and the Windward Islands; housewife consumers; banana workers’ unions. But I soon discovered that there were also new actors claiming roles on bananas’ world stage: large globalized super market chains such as Carrefour, Tesco, Walmart, and Costco; the ambitious Ecuadorian anti-union banana magnate Álvaro Noboa and his Bonita brand; the World Trade Organization (WTO); Brussels-based EU officials; fairtrade non-governmental organizations (NGOs); the transnational network of women banana workers. And, of course, the electronic social media: it has connected plantation worker activists and food security activists. The Web, however, has also reduced Carmen Miranda to merely an inspiration for drag selfies. Despite all these changes, I discovered that two things have persisted. First, as in earlier decades, today’s international political economy of bananas would have come unraveled without the labor of low-paid and unpaid women. This sophisticated system of growing and shipping and marketing a fragile fruit has been made to rely on imagining that women’s work is unskilled and that their wages are mere “pin money.” Secondly, even with this being the reality, and even with the recent outpourings of smart feminist-informed scholarly studies and activist reporting, it remains all too easy for many (most?) inter national political commentators to dismiss gender investigations of a highly profitable globalized product as an analytical side show. This is worth thinking about next time you slice a banana on top of your morning cereal. The workings of globalizing patriarchy, which had been so often trivialized in the late twentieth century, I found still remained an afterthought for many observers, even critical observers, who claimed to make sense of the world today. It was not just patriarchy that had proved sustainable, it was many experts’ lack of feminist curiosity that had persisted. Who is making the gender analysis of the World Trade Organization a featured case study in their university lectures? Which teachers are encouraging their students to undertake explicitly gendered analyses of the international politics of Tesco, Carrefour, or Chiquita? If anyone in a university, in an agency, or in a large NGO answers such a question confidently with, “Oh, our gender specialist handles those things,” that is evidence of the persistent “sideshow” phenomenon. Paying close attention to what is getting relegated to a “sideshow”—and who exactly is doing the relegating—can shine a bright light on what it is taking to sustain patriarchy. By doing a “gender analysis” I mean, initially, charting over time the positions of the women and of the men on all rungs on the ladder of any organization, institution, industry, or social movement. Then, looking at the chart, one needs to discover how the women got some places, and the men got other places. Next question to pose: who benefits from most women and men being where they are? “Gendering,” in other words, does not happen just down on the lowest rungs—in the trenches, on the assembly floor, amid the rubber trees, in the voting booths. Gendering happens up on the elite rungs as well. If most of those who are involved in trade treaty bargaining (or in peace negotiating or coup d’état plotting) are men, that decision-making is usually riddled with the workings of manliness. For instance, in each process there are likely to be efforts by one of the participants, maybe most of them, to feminize the others in order to damage their credibility. Therefore, doing a gender analysis also requires that one investigate (again, over time) each and every manipulation —by any of the actors, whether rivals or allies—of the ideas and practices of both masculinities and femininities. For example, when the male executives running the big three banana corporations introduced washing-sheds on their plantations in the 1960s, they manipulated ideas about femininity and what it meant to do “women’s work.” They engaged in these sorts of patriarchal manipulations so that they could justify characterizing washing-shed work as low skilled precisely because women were performing it. Women wash. That is what women do naturally. Thus it is not a skill. Therefore, it does not have to be paid for as if it were skilled work. Similarly, ideas about manliness are manipulated for organizational objectives. When the men (and occasionally a few women) devise strategies to recruit sufficient numbers of young men into either their statist or insurgent armed forces, they routinely portray fighting—or at least their wielding of weapons—as proving “real” manhood. If they can convince enough young men of the authenticity of this gender credential, they will be able, they believe, to fill their militarized ranks. Doing gender analysis is intellectually demanding. Neither casual observations nor stereotypical assumptions are enough. I learned this anew as I set about writing the updated Bananas, Beaches and Bases. Yet, when I plunged into the updating of the international politics of military bases, of bananas, of garments, of tourism, of diplomacy, of domestic workers, and of nationalism, I was struck again by how, amidst all the admittedly important changes that had occurred during that last twenty-five years, the patriarchal dynamics of international politics had persisted. Finding these persistencies has reinforced my sense that patriarchy is a crucial concept for making reliable sense of international politics. It is not some old-fashioned notion. Patriarchy is as up-to-date as the ripest banana and as the deadliest military unit. International political relationships and tendencies are patriarchal when either of them depends, in significant measure, on the privileging of certain sorts of masculinities in both the distributions of power and the distributions of status and material rewards. And patriarchy is at work when anything that is deemed feminine is positioned either on a pedestal, to be admired but not to wield authority, or on the lower rungs of the international system’s ranked order, where it can be controlled and/or exploited for the benefit of those deemed less feminized. At the same time, finding these persistencies has made me newly aware of international political patriarchy’s remarkable capacities for adaptation. The only way to study adaptability is to track the phenomenon over time. Merely to pay attention to the present will lead one to underestimate the capacities of any structural system, or of any cultural system, for adaptation. And that will risk not only failing to press for meaningful change, but being left in the theoretical dust. Here are some patriarchal persistencies I uncovered while researching the new edition of Bananas, Beaches and Bases. The Pentagon can close its mammoth Subic navy base in the Philippines, and dramatically expand its bases in Guam and Italy, and open new “lily pad” bases in the United Arab Emirates and Sub-Saharan Africa, yet the US security doctrine continues to depend on government-to-government agreements to control the interactions of local women with its own male military personnel. Look at any government’s military bases anywhere on the globe. Each of those military bases—American, Russian, Chinese, French, British, Saudi—depends in part on governments controlling soldier husbands’ relationships with their civilian wives, who usually are left back at home (see Chapter Six). Simultaneously, each of those bases relies on cooperating with host government officials to regulate sexual relationships between military men (and militarized contractor men) and local or refugee girls and women in the vicinity. Nationalists of assorted stripes may now be utilizing Facebook and Twitter, yet a great many of them continue to envision an old-fashioned “nation” made up of masculinized protectors and the feminized protected. In that sort of nation, the protectors remain the ones popularly presumed to have the skills required to lead peace negotiations, write constitutions, rank state priorities, deploy security forces, and go head-to-head with foreign rivals. Foreign service bureaucracies of myriad countries can open their diplomatic career tracks to more women and even declare that diplomats’ spouses need only perform social roles as “volunteers”; nonetheless, they can continue to rely on women as unpaid wives to grease the diplomatic gears of their trade and security negotiations. (The growing numbers of diplomatic spouses who are male do not really figure into this persistent calculation.) Globalized apparel corporations can migrate from South Korea to China, or to Bangladesh, Indonesia, or Cambodia, while also inserting more intermediaries between themselves and the workers at the sewing machines, with the goal of staving off the criticisms of new NGO monitors; all the while, those same corporations’ executives and their host country state elite partners persist in masculinizing their own alliances and in feminizing clothing production as the joint sine qua non of their respective institutional securities. Mango, North Face, and Old Navy may offer hip new styles, but they are relying on old gender formulas. Now, a warning: to uncover these continuities does not mean that nothing in the gendered character of international politics has changed in recent decades. In fact, each of these explorations has shown me how much more work—how many more exercises of power—it takes now than it did, say, in the 1980s to sustain international patriarchal cultures and structures.

# Aff

## Links

### A2 Econ Link

#### Policy is key to economic gender equality—even gender-blind policies can contribute to feminist goals

Espino and de los Santos 21

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For labor market and social protection policies to fulfill their role, they need to adapt and respond to the nature of current labor markets. Economic growth does not automatically translate into new and better jobs. Since the 1980s, austerity macroeconomic policies have led to increasing unemployment in formal labor markets while increasing informal employment (UN Women 2017). While women’s labor force participation has been growing, limited decent job opportunities constrains women’s employment options in formal labor markets. In Latin America, the best outcomes in terms of formalization in the early 21st century have occurred in contexts of accelerated economic growth and institutional interventions and comprehensive policies, such as changes in legislation, labor enforcement of labor regulations and employment policies (Salazar-Xirinachs and Chacaltana 2018). Some of the formalization strategies specifically aimed at work with considerable informality rates. For instance, in several Latin American countries special taxation schemes were designed for micro and small enterprises and own-account workers and pieces of legislation were passed to regulate minimum wage and working hours of domestic and rural workers. However, thus far, informality rates have not changed dramatically, suggesting that there is a strong structural component in the regional labor market segmentation (UN Women 2017).Informal work in the Global South 203 The debate on benefits of formalization includes the perspective of organized women informal workers of the Global South. Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) argues that the right to the city (i.e., a claim to recognize the city as a co-created space) as well as economic rights should prevail when discussing, for instance, street vendor’s activities. A legalist approach that forces them to formalize may have negative effect on women’s well-being as this may push them out of employment. Alternatively, there are good examples of regularization via complex public, private and community partnership models such as in Bhubaneshwar. This city is among the first ones in India to acknowledge street vendors as an integral part of the city by establishing aesthetically pleasing fixed kiosks in legally sanctioned vending zones (Kumar 2012). Some public policies tend to be gender blind and lack awareness regarding the importance of promoting women’s autonomy and economic empowerment to move toward a more egalitarian society. Accordingly, policy changes regarding work formalization in Latin America do not have clear objectives regarding the gendered constraints women face in informal employment (except for those addressing domestic service work). However, in 2016–17, a growing number of economies in the Global South have implemented employment policies and measures based on both gender equality principles and formalization of the informal economy. Even when policy is gender-blind, it can benefit women. Otobe (2017) describes two such experiences: the National Human Resources and Employment Policy for Sri Lanka and the National Employment Policy of Mozambique. While articulation of policy measures on formalization of informal employment is not necessarily gender inclusive or responsive in either case, policy measures stated under gender issues could contribute to formalization by promoting formal employment for both women and men equally. Feminist insights on the impact of informal employment Remunerated work opportunities vary from low-waged precarious forms of informal employment to formal jobs, which normally offer higher wages, more stability and a certain level of social protection and security. Informal work may lead to economic and social empowerment as it contributes to poverty alleviation at the household level (USAID 2005) and it may ease the “double burden” of paid and unpaid work, through more flexible work schedules. However, freer access to informal labor markets will not eliminate the disadvantages arising from male-biased institutions (Meagher 2010). For example, gender pay gaps are often wider in informal employment compared to formal employment. For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa, the gender pay gap is 28 percent in informal employment compared to 6 percent for formal workers. In the informal economy, men predominate among employers and employees while women are over-represented among the least-secure and lowest-paying occupations (e.g., homeworkers and contributing family workers) (UN Women 2017). On the other hand, informal work could allow women to have their own incomes and access to the public sphere, thus reducing their dependence on male income-earners (Kabeer 2008, 2012). In their study of the Ecuador, Vega et al. (2016) conclude that the economic livelihood strategies are not necessarily translated into empowerment processes. Nevertheless, they argue that particularly young women see informal activities as temporary, in which case these strategies may be a means to enhance social mobility and to improve their prospects. Moreover, there are examples of informal, poor women workers organizing and being empowered, such as through SEWA (Self Employed Women’s Association) and WIEGO. Agenda for decent work Most studies of informal employment have not incorporated a critical perspective that examines gendered power relations (Chant and Pedwell 2008). They also lack an intersectional approach that takes into account the differences and relations among women. An in-depth study of these aspects requires quantitative and qualitative research, which will shed light on the processes and subjective elements and their impact on women’s autonomy and economic empowerment. Gender-blind analyses of the mechanisms and features of informality in labor markets lead to partial explanations and therefore partial solutions to informality. Thus, addressing economic and social causes of informal employment is as important as identifying and examining the implications of gender discrimination and employment segregation and the gender division of paid and unpaid work that contribute to informality. Moreover, it is necessary to incorporate an intersectional perspective, which addresses not only gender but a range of axes of social differentiation such as class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, age, nation, religion and ability (Chant and Pedwell 2008). Considering that informal employment is principally a problem of weak labor demand, macroeconomic policies should target increasing labor demand. Particularly, to tackle gender inequality in the labor market, there is a need to invest in public care services and create decent job opportunities in the areas of health, education, child and elderly care services (ILO 2018d). The redistribution of unpaid household work and care work not only within households (between women and men) but also among public and private sector actors should be included as part of public policies based on principles of equity and social co-responsibility. Public policies that facilitate equitable sharing of care work allow women to enter the labor force and to avoid precarious forms of work. These policies include parental leave policies and public provision of child and elderly care services. To combat occupational segregation, public interventions are important to address its root causes, including differences in educational attainment, training and experience as well as stereotypes about the roles of women and men in society. To provide women with income opportunities beyond informal employment it is also necessary to strengthen women’s income security, for example, by providing access to unemployment protection and public work programs (UN Women 2017). Addressing informality and decent work deficits require changes in the design and application of social protection programs. As the 101st Session of the International Labor Conference made clear in Recommendation No. 202, the social protection floor is a means of extending social security coverage where the contributory and noncontributory benefits operate in conjunction (ILO 2012). This combination may have positive impacts on job quality and may promote formalization. Given higher levels of participation of women in informal, precarious forms of work and the interruption of their work career because of their reproductive role and disproportionate care work burden, a strong non-contributory pillar of social protection scheme could be the key to promoting gender equality in social protection.

## State Good

\*\*\*Note: these cards can apply to any kritik

### Liberalism Good

#### Liberalism is key to checking oppression—policy reforms key to maintaining the liberal world order

Traub 22

James, nonresident fellow at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation. "Liberalism Isn’t Dead—but It’s Very Sick", Foreign Policy, 5/10/2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/10/liberalism-democracy-decline-autocracy-mounk-fukuyama-books/> LJS

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has played out like a terribly grim, but so far at least, profoundly ennobling laboratory experiment in the relative virtues of autocracy and liberal democracy. Yet evidence that a (more or less) liberal democracy can defeat or withstand an autocracy even in war—the one sphere that so obviously favors the latter—hasn’t, and probably won’t, meaningfully diminish the forces that have undermined liberalism in the West and around the world. Indeed, the sharp division between Western democracies that regard the invasion as an intolerable violation of moral principle and non-Western and barely liberal ones like India and South Africa that have treated it as geopolitics as usual only reinforces the idea that liberal democracy occupies a diminishing space in the world. It is possible that liberal democracy was a historically contingent experiment that depended on underlying conditions that no longer obtain. In his 2018 book, The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It, Harvard scholar Yascha Mounk described those limiting conditions as broadly shared prosperity, relative demographic homogeneity, and sources of information that encompass the whole population. That was the last century, not this one. Yet if you believe that all alternatives to liberal democracy are much worse—indeed, unbearable—then you must proceed as if the illness it suffers from is curable. That is the premise of Mounk’s new work, the more optimistically titled The Great Experiment: Why Diverse Democracies Fall Apart and How They Can Endure, as well as Liberalism and Its Discontents by Francis Fukuyama, also a long-standing combatant in the liberalism wars. Liberalism, as Fukuyama describes it, functions as a political technology for the management of otherwise irreconcilable differences. Liberals from the time of Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century have erected a series of procedural rules and normative principles—above all, the rule of law and the rights of individuals to pursue their own preferences—to limit the reach of absolutist doctrines. Liberal rules and norms allow people of different views not only to get along but to subscribe to the implicit “contract” on which democratic government rests. Liberalism is endangered when the “factions,” to use James Madison’s term, that arise naturally in society cease to respect the rules and norms. But liberalism has a problem when those factions consist not of like-minded individuals but of tribes: ethnic or religious groups bound together less by changeable beliefs than by immutable characteristics. A “diverse democracy,” in Mounk’s sense, is a heterogeneous one. In such states, “where virtually everyone votes along religious or ethnic lines,” Mounk observes, “a large portion of the population forms a permanent minority,” locked out of power, while majorities use their power to dominate or marginalize minorities, as white people did to Black people in the American antebellum and Jim Crow South and as Hindus now do to Muslims in India. Liberalism addresses people as equal, free-standing citizens; but Mounk has concluded that the wish to stand apart from kin, culture, and state is less primordial than we think. Both experience and social science research show us that people are by nature “groupish.” The chief threat to liberalism over the last decade has been majoritarian nationalism provoked by real or alleged threats to collective identity—whiteness in the United States and Europe, Hinduism in India, Judaism in Israel, and Islam in Turkey. Against this rage, liberal universalism, the idea that we all have equal rights based in our common humanity, has steadily retreated. No one has developed an entirely convincing answer to the problem of diverse democracy. The “consociational” model, where power is allocated among groups that enjoy formal status, has worked out well in the Netherlands, divided between Catholics and Protestants, but very badly in Lebanon, where power-sharing among different religious factions has currently produced a vacuum of governance very close to anarchy. Slightly over 40 percent of the French public just voted for a presidential candidate who promised to restore the primacy of natives over newcomers and, not coincidentally, white people over people of color. The first wave of rise-of-illiberalism books—including Mounk’s and Fukuyama’s earlier books as well as Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt’s How Democracies Die and my own What Was Liberalism?: The Past, Present, and Promise of a Noble Idea—focused almost entirely on the right-wing nationalism of former U.S. President Donald Trump, French politician Marine Le Pen, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and others. That’s old news by now. One of the features of the new generation of liberalism-in-peril books is worry over the rise of an identitarian left that is equally contemptuous of liberal restraints. Fukuyama writes of a species of identity politics that “sees the lived experiences of different groups as fundamentally incommensurate.” White people cannot understand what it means to be Black; racism is not an individual attitude but is rather imprinted in the structures of power, and thus in collective consciousness. Mounk describes the “strategic essentialism” of those who insist that we treat race or gender as ineradicable essences. This is the new groupishness of the left. Anyone who has spent time in the advanced institutions of American culture—universities, art museums, foundations, newspapers—will recognize this mentality. It is, however, striking that while right-wing nationalism has circled the globe, the so-called woke left is an almost entirely U.S. phenomenon. It explains nothing about illiberalism in India or Poland and very little about France or Germany. Why is it that the most advanced progressive thinking in the United States, but not elsewhere, is obsessed with the policing of group boundaries and the honoring of group rights? Perhaps because of the unique role that racial anger and racial shame play in the United States. The effect, in any case, is to set up a kind of reciprocal tribalism, where the left and right goad each other to greater extremes. Both agree on the need to weed out evil books from libraries but disagree violently over the books in question; meanwhile, what historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. called the “vital center” recedes to an ever more distant horizon. What is to be done? Fukuyama’s answer is to defend the citadel. In this slim volume (a euphemism for a long magazine article by a famous author that publishers are eager to issue in book form), Fukuyama, in the manner of philosopher Isaiah Berlin, traces the evolutionary path of the new illiberal ideologies, locating their origin in the postmodern critique of rationality of philosophers Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, a doctrine of the radical left later picked up by the right. And then, like a stout crusader of liberalism, he smites them one and all. Fukuyama first refutes what might be called the neoliberal or free market heresy of liberalism, noting that while humans are indeed self-seeking, “they are also intensely social creatures who cannot be individually happy without the support and recognition provided by their peers.” But neoliberalism is a heresy, or a perversion, for liberal societies created the redistributionist state that promoted equality in the 20th century. Fukuyama goes on to note that liberalism is not so obsessed with the individual as to inevitably atomize society, as many Catholic conservatives claim: “Private associational life has grown enormously” in the liberal societies of the West. Nor must liberal states plead guilty to colonialism. How, after all, should we explain the rise of liberal East Asian states innocent of that charge? Fukuyama reminds liberals of what they stand for and why they are right to stand for it. Of course, that’s not a solution. Mounk writes that big books about ideas tend to be far better at explaining the problem than at offering solutions. Another way of putting it, though, is that illiberalism is the kind of problem to which solutions inevitably feel inadequate because the problem is not a failure of policy but of collective belief. How do you create conditions that will favor a restoration of a vanished consensus? For Mounk, that comes down to the question of mechanisms to contain and channel the tribalism that one cannot wish away. Ranked choice voting, for example, will help gain representation for minorities, he argues. Much of Mounk’s agenda resembles the current Democratic Party platform: broad-based economic growth, progressive taxation, and opportunities for social mobility—all designed to create a sense of collective rather than tribal good. In that vein, he argues—against the progressive left—for universal rather than race-conscious policies and for limits on immigration, a flash point for the nativist right. These are good solutions, but I do not see how they will cure the patient. (For the record, I was not entirely convinced by the solutions I offered in What Was Liberalism?) Mounk doesn’t entirely disagree: He writes that liberalism ultimately must be defended at the level of private and social behavior. He advises all of us to think for ourselves and be prepared to criticize our own side and restrain the impulse to vilify the other. I am guessing that most readers of his book will not need that advice, whereas the tribalists of left and right would sneer at it. I read The Great Experiment while thinking about India, the biggest and most diverse of the world’s democracies. India is also among the sickest patients in the liberal democracy ward. Born under the star of secularism and tolerance, India under Modi has increasingly become a theistic and intolerant society that advances the cause of Hinduism at the expense of its more than 200 million Muslims. I asked myself whether Mounk had anything to offer the many Indians who believe in the nation’s secular values and deeply fear their demise. The answer is: not much. Some diseases prove fatal; others can only be cured very slowly, as the patient’s own defenses finally rally. I am in favor of everything Mounk suggests; I am even more in favor of Fukuyama’s rousing call to truth. Only liberalism, as both authors argue, can allow us to live safely and prosperously in a diverse world. But I recognize that the restraints imposed by liberal rules and norms ask a great deal of citizens, far more than nativism, nationalism, or majoritarian tyranny do. We need to keep fighting for what is right even as we recognize that the road will be long.

#### Modern liberalism good—defensive liberalism is the most effective tool for emancipation in modernity and reforms solve its flaws

Ikenberry 2020

G. John, the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. “Mastering Modernity.” A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order. Pp 294-303. LJS

On what grounds can we defend liberal internationalism? This question can be answered by looking at six major debates that liberal internationalists have had among themselves over their project’s scope and character. In these debates, they have grappled with the trade-offs between efficiency and social stability, sovereignty and interventionism, and global openness and political community. They have debated the nature of “the global”—the forces and logic shaping the modern world and their implications for the security and well-being of liberal democracy. As they did in past crises, liberal internationalists must again debate the character, limits, and possibilities of their project. Efficiency versus Social Stability A core strand of liberal internationalism has been a commitment to open trade. Countries linked by trade and open markets gain both economically and politically. Ideally, trade generates efficiency and welfare gains for countries that participate, thus facilitating their growth and advancement. These mutual gains and interdependence have political effects, including heightened incentives to settle disputes peacefully. From the British repeal of the Corn Laws to the post-1945 building of a multilateral trading system, liberal democracies have consistently looked for ways to realize the gains of trade. Winners win more than losers lose, so if the winnings are distributed in ways that compensate the losers, everyone comes out ahead. But open trade is a disruptive threat to workers and communities, and the social bargains that soften the impact of economic dislocation are imperfect. In giving national governments space and policy tools to pursue economic stabilization and development, the “embedded liberalism” behind the reconstruction of the postwar Western world tried to reconcile open trade and free-market capitalism with social protections and economic security. As we saw in chapter 8, this compromise has broken down. The embrace of neoliberal policies and the deregulation and global integration of capital markets that accompanied the post–Cold War spread of economic and political liberalism have been driving forces. The Western governments’ capacity and willingness to maintain their social democratic commitments has waned. Even under the best of conditions, the model of international trade at the heart of economic liberalism oversimplifies reality. “It neglects all the noneconomic considerations that so often turn governments away from its prescriptions, such as the social and cultural side-effects of trade, or the frequent neglect of public goods, collective equipments, and education,” writes Stanley Hoffmann. “Above all, it ignores factors of inequality: the benefits from free trade spread slowly, if at all, and unevenly through the formidable barriers of privilege, class, and status within societies (in which small groups often monopolize the rewards) and the obstacles of unequal endowments and levels of development in the world.”1 Not all the rise in inequality or the breakdown in economic and social protections is traceable to the liberalization of trade and capital flows. Technological changes in the workplace and shifts from manufacturing to services also play a role.2 But efficiency gains from deeper economic integration seem to be slowing relative to the rise of economic insecurity and inequality. Dani Rodrik argues that the advanced industrial countries have already passed the point beyond which expanded trade does more to redistribute wealth within their societies than to increase efficiency and growth. Although economic globalization is intensifying the gaps between the winners and losers, it is not generating sufficient economic gains to compensate the losers.3 In making the case for economic openness, liberal internationalists will need to reestablish the foundations of embedded liberalism—that is, managed openness that reconnects trade and markets with social security and shared gains. The industrial world cannot return to the early decades of the Bretton Woods system, but it can look for new ways to balance openness and social protections. The aim of reforming international rules and institutions should be to enable national governments to make good on their social democratic commitments. “Democracies have a right to protect their social arrangements,” Rodrik argues, “and when this right clashes with the requirements of the global economy, it is the latter that should give way.”4 Economic openness can last in liberal democracies only if it is tied to a social ethic of fairness and shared benefits. Without inaugurating a new era of protectionism, liberal democracies have to reestablish the multilateral system of rules and institutions that allows states to manage openness, guided by the liberal norms of multilateralism, reciprocity, and nondiscrimination. They need to rebuild the social contract at home and renew the international rules and norms that balance openness with social stability. Sovereignty versus Interventionism The norms of sovereign equality and national self-determination are integral to the modern liberal international vision. As we have seen, by the second half of the twentieth century, the liberal international project was firmly built on a Westphalian foundation. To be sure, the United States and other liberal states have repeatedly practiced all the dark arts of power politics. Throughout the Cold War and post–Cold War decades, they have transgressed sovereignty norms through military intervention, covert action, and coercive regime change. But the norms and principles of state sovereignty remain firmly embedded in the institutions and legitimating rationale of the post–World War II liberal international order. American military interventionism during the Cold War played out as part of the geopolitical and ideological struggle with the Soviet Union. The Korean and Vietnam Wars were the most tragic and costly of the dozens of armed interventions carried out by the United States across the Cold War periphery. Since the Soviet Union fell, the reasons for interventions have expanded to include humanitarian disasters, human rights violations, and nonstate terrorist threats. In areas of humanitarianism, economic policy, and democracy promotion, the Western liberal states look increasingly as if they are trying to impose their own values and interests on weaker states.5 In this regard, it is useful to distinguish between two versions of liberal internationalism: defensive and offensive.6 Defensive liberalism is the older liberal orientation anchored in the norms of self-determination and the right of countries to maintain their own institutions and doctrines. Offensive liberalism is the more recent universalizing agenda that involves the reordering of other societies.7 Rising states such as China, India, and Brazil tend to embrace defensive liberalism and resist the intrusiveness of the newer liberalism. In accommodating these rising powers, liberal internationalism will need to rethink their offensive liberal impulses. Gaining agreement on the broader principles of order—sovereignty and multilateral rules and institutions that allow states to manage their interdependence—should take precedence over efforts to force convergence on the details of development or governance. In the areas of human rights and transnational terrorism, the dilemmas are less about the imposition of liberal values on unwilling states than about the circumstances under which the international community needs to act.8 When a state commits mass domestic violence such as genocide or ethnic cleansing, the outside world cannot simply look away. If a state is collapsed or unable to prevent transnational terrorist groups from operating on its territory, these circumstances might also require the international community’s intervention. The response proposed for these occasions is the evolving norm of “responsibility to protect” (R2P), which was adopted by the United Nations in 2005 and remains controversial.9 R2P is not a license for great powers to unilaterally intervene in weaker states. It is meant to stimulate international agreement on the circumstances under which agents of the international community—authorized by the United Nations—are morally obliged to prevent or stop atrocities. The burden of the norm is actually Westphalian in implication. Its goal is to strengthen the presumption that national governments must make good on their obligations as sovereign states and that the international order should help them do so. Only in the absence of this Westphalian state capacity—and under extreme conditions defined by the international community—do outside powers intervene. The goal for liberal internationalists should be to seek as wide an agreement as possible on the legal bases for intervention.10 Clubs and Open Systems The postwar liberal international order was built around exclusive groupings of states, such as NATO and the European Union, as well as wider multilateral organizations with more open membership, such as the United Nations. When the Cold War broke the world into bipolar blocs, the United States and its partners put their efforts into building the Western economic and security order. This Western political grouping resembled a club. It was a clearly defined, exclusive group of like-minded states with a shared identity based on their regime characteristics, geography, and historical experience. There was little doubt about who was inside and who was outside the order.11 As I argued in chapter 6, the club character of the postwar liberal order was important for its functioning. To be inside was to have rights and responsibilities. The club offered protection and provided governments with institutions and capacities to facilitate cooperation and problem solving. The compromises of embedded liberalism were organized within its confines. That there were barriers to entry only reinforced commitment and cooperation. In chapter 8, I argued that the erosion of this club-like nature is a defining feature of the current crisis. Open systems of multilateral cooperation, which reflect the Westphalian norms of sovereign equality and nondiscrimination that are embedded in the wider global order, are also integral to the liberal international vision. Membership in these organizations is predicated not on regime character, but only on recognition of a state’s sovereign status and its commitment and ability to carry out the responsibilities of membership. If the legitimacy of the club of liberal democracies lies in their shared social purposes, the legitimacy of open systems of order derives from the universalism inherent in Westphalian principles of sovereignty. An open system’s strength is its inclusiveness. For many realms of international relations—including arms control, pandemic disease prevention, environmental regulation, and management of the global commons—regime type is not relevant to cooperation. Addressing these problems requires as wide a participation of states as possible. The weakness of open systems is in enforcement. If the rules say that any state can be in or out as it chooses, the benefits of membership cannot be predicated on embracing a suite of values and responsibilities. Liberal internationalists, including Woodrow Wilson, have spoken up for both types of order. Initially, in offering American support for a postwar organization, Wilson argued in favor of open and universal membership. In his speech to the League to Enforce the Peace in May 1916, Wilson said the United States “shall be as much concerned as the nations at war to see peace assume an aspect of permanence.” This was why it would be in the nation’s interest to participate in a “universal association of the nations . . . to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence.” Eager not to be seen as committing the United States to upholding an unjust status quo, Wilson advanced general principles that would guide the settlement, including famously asserting that “every people” had “a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live,” and small states were entitled to “the same respect for their sovereignty and for their integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon.”12 During the years of American neutrality, Wilson did not once mention that the peace settlement would be linked to the way states were internally governed or the character of their regimes.13 In January 1917, Wilson’s “peace without victory” speech explicitly called for a settlement between existing states and regimes. It was only after Wilson brought the United States into the war that he shifted the focus to freedom and democracy as prerequisites for peace. In his War Address in April 1917, Wilson now asserted that “a steadfast concert of peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic governments. No autocratic state government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.”14 Wilson was now envisaging a more exclusive grouping of democracies that would be bound together ideologically and oriented toward building a democratic peace. After the war was over, Wilson essentially reverted back to the open and universal version of his program. For Wilson, in the end, the establishment of a League of Nations was more important than the specific logic of its membership. The question today for liberal internationalism is: How much of the clublike character of liberal order should and can be rebuilt? The goal is not to undermine or ignore the Westphalian principles that set the terms of wider global cooperation. But what is the future of the deeper, more exclusive cooperation among liberal democracies? In security relations, human rights, and the political economy of industrial society, liberal democracies have specific interests and values that illiberal states do not. Exclusive groupings within the wider international order are still an important means for advancing these values. So too is it important to strengthen the mechanisms of conditionality and the enforcement of norms and principles within the club. The European Union is struggling to respond to member states that transgress its common standards. NATO has also found itself struggling to deal with alliance members that lose their democratic character.15 The irony of the rise of China and Russia as overt challengers to Western liberal democracy is that it may strengthen the identity and functioning of the liberal democratic world as a political grouping, even as it gives illiberal states an alternative club to join. Relations with the Illiberal World Dealing with illiberal great powers is one of the oldest problems facing the liberal international order. Do you invite them in, anticipating that they will become socialized and move toward liberal democracy? Do you exclude them? Do you actively seek to confront their revisionist agendas, or seek peaceful coexistence? At different times over the past two centuries, liberal states have pursued all these strategies. The underlying reality is that the liberal international order—open, rules-based, and organized around a core of liberal democracies—is a threat to illiberal states. From their perspective, the United States and the liberal capitalist order are revisionist. The American grand strategy at the end of the Cold War was to invite the illiberal states into the liberal order. Once China and Russia gained the benefits of trade and exchange, went the reasoning, they would understand that it was in their interest to become “responsible stakeholders.” Implicit in this logic was the expectation that these states would engage in self-initiated regime change. They would slowly shed their autocratic and authoritarian institutions and move closer to the Western liberal democratic model. This has not happened, and liberal internationalists must now reassess their assumptions and consider new approaches. One option is to seek accommodation with these illiberal states by making the liberal international order less revisionist. This might mean curtailing efforts to promote “offensive” liberalism”—that is, efforts to push and pull these states toward the liberal democratic model. In effect, this strategy calls for making the liberal international order friendly to China and Russia by stepping back from the vision of a one-world liberal order. The emphasis instead would be on coexistence, building on the “defensive” liberal principles of self-determination, tolerance, and ideological pluralism. Liberal internationalism would be made more conservative.16 Another option is to confront illiberal states more aggressively. The assumption here is that China and Russia are the vanguard of a broader longterm challenge to the liberal international order. If it cannot contain the ambitions of these countries, the liberal order itself is threatened. This view hinges on a key claim about China: that it hopes to perfect an authoritarian model of industrial society that can compete with—and even surpass—the long-term growth capacity of liberal democracy. The jury is still out.17 But if China does succeed in offering the world an illiberal pathway to modernity, the stakes for the liberal democratic world rise and the rivalry can easily become a Cold War–style struggle between deeply antagonistic ideological and political projects. Finally, liberal internationalists might pursue a mixed strategy of looking for opportunities to cooperate with China and Russia on the playing field of Westphalian internationalism, focusing on shared functional problems such as arms control, environment, and the global commons, while actively seeking to consolidate and strengthen cooperation across the liberal democratic world. Here the assumption is that the liberal democracies—particularly if they are organized worldwide—have long-term advantages that will bend the grand struggle in their favor. The key is to renew and defend liberal democracy within like-minded states and to strengthen the institutions, functionality, and legitimacy of the liberal international order.18 Hegemony and Restraint on Power Over the past century, the liberal international project has become deeply entangled with the exercise of American power. Woodrow Wilson carried liberal internationalist ideas to the Paris Peace Conference. After World War II, the United States built a liberal hegemonic order organized around open, rules-based relations and a core of Western liberal democracies. As I argued in chapter 6, this liberal hegemonic order both amplified and legitimated American power as well as shaped and restrained it. The United States tied itself to the other leading liberal states and exercised power through an array of economic, political, and security institutions. How restrained it was during the postwar era is a subject of much debate. Institutional restraints were certainly not an iron cage, and the United States reserved the right to act unilaterally when it chose. Power politics was hardly eliminated from the democratic world. Nonetheless, this liberal hegemonic order did manifest important features of consent. The United States and the other Western liberal democracies used institutions to establish restraint and commitment, and in doing so, they created an order that was somewhat independent of balance-of-power and imperial logics. The presence of liberal institutions allowed these states to dampen the two forces that typically shape international order—anarchy and empire. These forces never totally disappeared, of course, but they retreated enough to define the Western order as a hierarchical order with liberal characteristics.19 Liberal internationalism has both benefited and suffered under American hegemony. Like Great Britain in the nineteenth century, the United States in the twentieth century incorporated liberal internationalist ideas and projects into its hegemonic order building while pursuing other great-power strategies. Great Britain held on to its empire, and the United States engaged in crude imperial ventures and cultivated close relations with illiberal states. But particularly after 1945, it is difficult to see how liberal internationalism— defined as open and rules-based order with progressive social purposes— would have fared any better if it were not closely tied to America’s efforts to organize and dominate the postwar international order. As I argued in chapter 6, American postwar leaders recognized the value of binding the nation to other liberal democracies and operating within the postwar system of multilateral institutions. This strategy made American power more legitimate and enduring. The liberal great power’s pursuit of enlightened self-interest was integral to the rise and spread of liberal ideas and projects. Yet the United States also demonstrated, repeatedly, that it can be an unfaithful steward of liberal internationalism. Under the Trump administration, it is actively seeking to undermine the liberal features of the existing global order. The challenge for liberal internationalists is to try to recover the connections between hegemony and liberal order. The reasons powerful liberal states might want to build and operate within a system of open, rules-based relations are clear enough. As I argued in chapter 8, the hollowing out of the security-community character of the existing liberal order is one reason it is now in crisis: today it is easier for leaders to offer alternative narratives of the American national interest. The Trump administration’s claims that the liberal order generates more costs than benefits for the United States also register with some voters. Yet the costs that the United States incurs from seeking to operate outside the rules and norms of liberal international order are also real—and over the long term, they are much greater. They include the loss of influence, credibility, and the cooperation of friends and allies. America’s democratic allies clearly want the United States to remain within this order. During the high tide of American unipolarity, it was possible for US officials to see less value in liberal rules and institutions. But in an era of declining American power, the value of cooperation with other liberal democracies should grow. Roles, responsibilities, expectations, bargains—these aspects of the postwar liberal order draw our attention precisely because the Trump administration ignores and undermines them. Yet lurking in this new danger is an opportunity to renegotiate the hegemonic character of liberal internationalism or, short of this, build a post-hegemonic consortium of like-minded states that could collectively underwrite a reformed liberal order.

### A2 Liberalism = Imperialism

#### Liberalism is key to checking imperialism—liberal ideology elevates universal rights

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If liberal internationalism had an urge for empire, it also had an urge to oppose it. In the late nineteenth century, liberal thinkers in the United States and Europe added their voices to movements against empire and colonialism. After the world wars, many liberal internationalists, particularly in the United States, championed the League of Nations and the United Nations as institutions that enshrined principles of self-determination and sovereign equality—and thus offered a path away from empire. As the twentieth century unfolded, liberal internationalists grew increasingly committed to postimperial forms of order. These changes in orientation played out in the struggles between the United States and Britain during and after World War II over imperial preferences and global spheres of influence. The shift away from empire emerged as part of the general reimagining of liberal internationalism in the 1940s and during the Cold War, when the United States put its weight behind a world organized around sovereign states as it pursued its expanding geopolitical interests and built postwar order. In important respects, however, it was not the West that turned liberal internationalism against empire and imperialism but the non-West, which seized upon ideas and principles—universal in character but often instrumental in origin and purpose—and applied them to struggles over sovereignty, rights, and rules. Wilson-era liberal internationalism had offered global ideas, but it retained an old-style Western parochialism. The vision of liberal order put forward by Wilson and his peers was more “civilizational” than “universal.” The League of Nations would be open to the wider world, but it was organized around the Western liberal democracies. States that were considered insufficiently mature to join the community of sovereign states would have to wait until they were ready. As Edward Keene argues, the League of Nations entailed the “internationalization” of civilization—so there were limits on the universal or global scope of membership and standing. “Although ideological concerns were beginning to become more important in defining the boundaries of the civilized world, racial discrimination was still a major element in deciding which peoples were entitled to membership in the new organization and thus to have their sovereign status recognized.”62 With the rebuilding of order after World War II and the establishment of the United Nations, this civilizational view—the distinction between the “family of civilized nations” and the rest of the world—gave way to a more universalistic and inclusive conception. Keene argues, “Simply put: the United Nations was envisioned as, or quite rapidly became, an organization of all the world’s peoples, with universal participation in the projects of preserving peace and developing global civilization, whereas the League had, above all, been an organization of civilized nations, working collectively for all the world’s peoples.” Postwar notions of states, peoples, sovereignty, and civilization were becoming less based on nineteenth-century notions of the social hierarchies of peoples. As Keene notes, “the development of the UN system reflected a much more inclusive attitude toward non-European peoples, in keeping with the recognition that they were no less civilized than their European counterparts.”63 What changed between 1919 and 1945 was the conception of how peoples and societies from different regions and civilizations related to each other as moral and legal entities, a move driven in part by a fuller acknowledgment of the universal reach of the notion of sovereign equality.64 But it was also driven by the growing salience of the “rights of peoples”—the spread of the claim that all human beings, by virtue of being human, have fundamental and inalienable rights. Behind this shift were changing views of modernity and civilization. Civilization itself was weakening as an intellectual construct, and modernity was not seen simply as something spreading outward from its Western center. The new divide was not the West versus the non-West—which had become untenable—but the liberal democratic world versus the illiberal world. Modernity empowered both sides of this political universe. In World War II, the great struggle on behalf of civilization had been against Nazi Germany, a European power that was itself employing scientific theories of race to legitimate its violence and aggression—ideas that had been used in the nineteenth century to defend European imperial domination over “backward” non-European peoples.65 In this sense, the old civilizational justification for two world orders—a Western system of civilized states and a backward and uncivilized world beyond—did not fail because non-European peoples gradually joined the “family of civilized nations.” It collapsed when civilized states—Germany, Japan, and Russia—joined the noncivilized world.66 As I noted in chapter 5, this shift in thinking occurred in the United States during the war years and continued during the Cold War. The rise of fascism and totalitarianism led Roosevelt and his contemporaries to let go of their notions of civilization, race, and nation and rethink the nature of liberalism and modernity. With threats to the liberal capitalist order now coming from inside the West, what it meant to be civilized could no longer be defined by race or culture or geography. This sentiment was captured by Leonard Woolf in a short book published in 1939, Barbarians at the Gate, in which he argued that civilization was not a geographical or even a cultural construction but a way of regulating individual behavior within human communities. Europe might have found a distinctive approach to restraining violence, tyranny, and predation, but civilization was distributed more widely around the world—and so too was the antithesis of civilization, or what Woolf called barbarism. Writing on the eve of World War II, Woolf argued that “the barbarian is, therefore, not only at the gates; he is always within the walls of our civilization, inside our minds and our hearts.”67 This new sense that the dangers to the liberal democratic world came from inside that world forced American and European internationalists to rethink their principles and projects. American liberal internationalists began to make more serious efforts to separate their project from the legacies of European imperialism. This separation was driven by evolving ideas about sovereignty and self-determination, grand shifts in geopolitical interests, depression, and wartime politics within Western liberal democracies, as well as by more immediate struggles brought on by the war and the way it changed the Anglo-American relationship. The United States did not have the same attachments to empire as the British, and cracks opened up within the West on whether and how the world would transition away from empire.68 This was seen most clearly at the Atlantic Charter meeting in 1941, where Roosevelt and Churchill disagreed over the future of the British imperial preference system and the principles of sovereign rights and self-determination.69

#### Liberalism is ideologically opposed to imperialism—the right to self-determination created an anti-colonial feedback loop between liberal democracies, former colonies, and oppressed groups within great powers

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A second force separating liberal internationalism and empire was the ideas themselves, filtered through political movements both in the liberal democracies and outside the Western world. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter, the most sweeping of these ideas, can be seen as efforts by wartime democratic leaders to mobilize their people for war. In this sense, they served an instrumental purpose. For Roosevelt, the Atlantic Charter was a way to legitimize for the American people their imminent entrance into the war. It was an effort to counter Nazi propaganda by offering subjugated nations and neutrals in Europe a sweeping liberal democratic vision of a better world to come. But even if universalist principles are uttered for instrumental reasons, once they enter into the discourse they become part of the contested ideological landscape upon which political struggles are waged.76 To be sure, some liberal internationalists were deeply committed to presiding over liberalism’s separation from empire. Roosevelt’s closest adviser on postwar planning, Sumner Welles—the driving force behind the Atlantic Charter and later the United Nations—earnestly sought to use wartime negotiations with the British to escort Britain’s empire offstage. He and other Wilsonians had spent the 1930s reflecting on the failures of 1919, looking for new ways to build a cooperative global order that, as Welles put it, “implies the juridic equality of every nation and the acceptance of a moral order and of effective international law.”77 Welles sought to lay down principles that would weaken the political standing of empire in the postwar world.78 But it was the wider use of self-determination and sovereign equality that gave these principles impact. This struggle was waged on many fronts, driven by geopolitical and ideological clashes and movements within the West and between it and the non-West. It is not simply—or primarily—a story of the West “externalizing” its ideas and institutions to the rest of the world. NonWestern peoples and societies seized on the principles and institutions that the West had developed for itself and adapted them for their own purposes in their struggles for independence. Witnessing the decolonization movements in 1964, Rupert Emerson observed that when non-Western people “press for equality, democracy, and the right of self-determination, they are asking their present and erstwhile rulers to live up to the ideals which these same rulers have transmitted to them and proclaimed as their own. . . . The nationalism which developed in the imperial West in the nineteenth century, with its implied right of self-determination, can in this sense be seen as one of the key sources of anti-colonialism.”79 Westphalian and liberal internationalist ideas were both pushed and pulled into the rest of the world. The “reception and remolding of Western ideas” by peoples and societies in the non-West, C. A. Bayly argues, “set limits on the nature and extent of their domination by European power-holders.”80 The formal and informal unraveling of empire and colonialism is one of the great dramas of the post-1945 era. From the 1950s to the early 1960s, the previous century’s era of imperial expansion underwent a radical reversal. Robin Winks notes, “One after another, the colonized territories tried to establish their independence from European control. From Guinea to Somalia, from Morocco to India, the flags of France, Britain, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal came down. In their place were hoisted newly designed flags of the newly sovereign states. By the mid-1980s, no substantial area was under colonial rule, although the radically discriminatory regime prevailed in the Republic of Africa.”81 The predominant view in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century was that the imperial system would remain the core organizing logic of world order. Yet, in less than a hundred years, these empires—along with the Soviet Union—had disappeared.82 Political movements in the United States and the other liberal democracies also had a behind-the-scenes impact on their government’s policies toward empire. In the nineteenth century, the British anti–slave trade movement pressed the Parliament to abolish the slave trade throughout the British Empire. During and after World War I, the women’s suffrage movement in the United States and Britain became increasingly active in international affairs. The war itself affected the lives of women, galvanizing the suffragist movement and illuminating the role of war in modern society. Many in the movement made a direct connection between the right to vote and campaigns for peace and worldwide social justice.83 During the war, women’s groups on both sides of the Atlantic, led by figures such as Jane Addams and Emily Greene Balch, actively participated in debates on the postwar settlement.84 Together, Addams and Balch became leaders of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, devoted to peace education, international dialogue, and socially progressive causes, for which they later received the Nobel Peace Prize.85 This group and others explicitly linked the denial of women’s rights and social justice in their societies to the pursuit of militarism and imperialism abroad. During the 1940s, domestic political struggles—particularly over civil rights—and the continuing activities of progressive movements reinforced liberal internationalist efforts abroad. Americans struggling for civil rights explicitly linked their causes with anticolonial movements.86 The linkage showed itself, for example, in June 1942, when Walter White, representing the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, met with Sumner Welles and urged the Roosevelt administration to call a “Pacific Conference” devoted to ending colonial rule in Asia. White wanted FDR to meet with Indian leaders such as Nehru and Gandhi and the Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek to announce America’s support for Asian statehood and national self-rule. White also suggested that, with the “Pacific Charter” in hand, a delegation of Americans, led by Wendell Willkie and a “distinguished American Negro whose complexion unmistakably identifies him as being a colored man,” should go to India and announce American support for the Indian struggle.”87 The idea did not have great support in the administration. Even those who took issue with the British Empire were unwilling to take steps that might weaken Britain’s position in the struggle with Nazi Germany. After World War II, the American civil rights movement and social justice campaigns drew connections between their struggles and the struggles of nationalist and anti-imperialists abroad. In 1947, W. E. B. Du Bois used the platform of the United Nations for “An Appeal to the World,” describing the injustices of racial segregation and inequality in the United States and associating the struggles of African Americans with the victims of colonialism in Africa and elsewhere. “Our treatment is not merely an internal question for the United States,” he argued, “it is a basic problem of humanity.”88 Not only did civil rights activists appeal to international audiences for support and solidarity, many US political leaders also saw progress on civil rights as integral to fighting the Cold War. During these decades, the American government’s relationship to civil rights legislation was shaped by the sense that it was necessary to manage its international image. As the historian Mary Dudziak argues, “the need to address international criticism gave the federal government an incentive to promote social change at home.”89 The connections also ran in the other direction as the American civil rights movement, along with other social justice advocates, put pressure on the US government to support anticolonial causes abroad.90

#### Liberalism is structurally opposed to imperialism—liberal organizations are vehicles for anti-colonial and anti-patriarchal struggle

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Third, the international organizations established after the two world wars created platforms and capacities that experts and activists could use in their struggles against empire. While the League of Nations and, later, the United Nations helped Britain and other European states secure what remained of their imperial holdings, they also served as institutional sites for activism and repositories of universalistic norms and principles that opponents of empire could deploy in their struggles for self-rule. Both the league and the United Nations created institutional channels for groups that previously had little input into diplomacy or the shaping of international rules and practices to provide a counterweight to the old imperial order. These groups included women’s organizations, international activists, and non-Western governments and peoples.91 As I have noted, the Great War did not quell the European appetite for empire, and the League of Nations was widely seen in Europe and Great Britain as an opportunity to strengthen the prestige and administration of imperial rule. But the league also played a role—if a conflicted and awkward one—in moving the world toward the end of empire and the spread of selfdetermination. “If one considers its work in stabilizing new states and running the minorities protection and mandates system,” Susan Pedersen argues, “the League appears as a key agent in the transition from a world of formal empires to a world of formally sovereign states.”92 Pedersen looks specifically at the league’s Permanent Mandates Commission, the system established in 1921 to manage the territories in Africa, the Middle East, and the Pacific that Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire had lost in the war. The mandates system did not directly alter the aims of the remaining imperial powers, which sought to preserve their colonies and continued to see empire as a civilizing mission. “What was new,” Pedersen argues, “was the apparatus and the level of international diplomacy, publicity, and ‘talk’ that the system brought into being.” The mandates system was a vehicle for “internationalization”—a process “by which certain political issues and functions are displaced from the national or imperial, and into the international realm.”93 Unintended by its architects, the mandates system became a vehicle by which those favoring self-determination and revision of the Versailles settlement could press their claims. It provided a platform for internationalists, humanitarians, nationalists, and others who sought to expose the dark side of imperial rule. The wider league complex of institutions had the same effect, drawing international commissions, organizations, lobbyists, and experts into a sprawling and ongoing debate about the future of European empire and the normative foundations of statehood.94 It would take decades and another world war to bring about a global system of sovereign states. But the league pointed the way. India took advantage of the League of Nations to gain rights and recognition before its independence in 1947. Great Britain, in an effort to strengthen its presence and voting share at Versailles, overcame the opposition of the other great powers to gain separate representation for its dominions, including India. Although still a British dependency, India—along with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa—actively participated in the conference’s deliberations and signed the peace treaty on the basis of “legal equality.”95 Because the Covenant of the League of Nations was part of the peace treaty, India acquired the right to become a founding member of the league, the only state among the thirty-one original members that was not legally self-governing. India’s internal and external relations continued to rest with the British government, but as one observer notes, “for the first time in the modern period, [India] came into direct and formal contact with the outside world.”96 Between 1919 and 1947, India’s position within the international legal system remains anomalous. While formally not a sovereign state, India exercised treaty-making power and participated in almost every international conference after 1920. As a league member, India attended the Washington Conference on Naval Armaments in 1921, signed the Washington treaty, and was admitted to the International Labour Organization, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and other league-related organizations. It signed numerous multilateral treaties, including the KelloggBriand Pact of 1928.97 In 1945, India was invited to the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations, and it became a founding member of the new world organization. Over this period, India’s self-governing status remained limited and many Indian nationalist leaders saw their country’s presence in these international bodies as a capitulation to British imperialism. Nonetheless, India took advantage of the status it gained over these decades to pave the way for independence, consolidating India as a diplomatic unit and giving its nationalist movement international recognition.98 The United Nations was even more explicit in facilitating the transition away from empire. It formally enshrined the idea of universal membership in a world of sovereign states and provided the legal and political framework for the recognition and integration of new states into the postimperial Westphalian order. As decolonization accelerated, the United Nations rapidly expanded from 51 original members in 1945, to 100 in September 1961, and to 159 by the end of 1985. Ironically, the United Nations is widely seen as the embodiment of internationalist ideas, but its greatest achievement may be the global triumph of the sovereign state system. Adam Roberts notes the United Nations’ importance in providing a framework for decolonization: The UN sometimes assisted the process of decolonization through referenda, and also through General Assembly resolutions—most notably the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. But its most important contribution was in providing a framework for entry into international society of the numerous new and reconstituted states, many of which were intensely vulnerable. For them, the UN was not just the main means of securing diplomatic recognition, but also a world stage, a negotiating forum, a provider of well-paid jobs, and a source of symbolic protection. The UN embodies principles, including racial equality and the sovereign equality of states, that were vital to the decolonization process.99

#### Liberalism is least coercive and self-reflexive

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How do we square these contradictory impulses? If liberal internationalism has offered a vision of a postimperial global order, is it also implicated in a pattern of liberal interventionism, or liberal imperialism? Some critics see liberal internationalism as a fig leaf with which elites disguise and legitimate more traditional great-power impulses. The problem with liberal internationalism is that it does not put a sufficient ideological or political brake on American interventionism. Other critics make an even stronger argument—that liberalism itself drives American interventionism. As ideologies and political projects, liberalism and liberal internationalism are inherently revisionist. It is American liberalism that leads the United States to intervene and seek to reshape other societies. For realist critics, the liberal sources of American interventionism look particularly striking since the end of the Cold War, when the United States emerged unrivaled and undisciplined by the bipolar balance of power. Equipped with unipolar power and liberal internationalist ideas, the United States found itself supporting the expansion of NATO and the European Union, engaging in humanitarian intervention, projecting itself into regional conflicts and civil wars, and pursuing violent regime change, most fatefully in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The suggestion is that a more realist-oriented America would have pursued a more restrained vision of the national interest.106 The liberal tradition has certainly informed the conduct of American foreign policy. As I noted in chapter 6, during the Cold War, liberalism became a “fighting faith” that tied American power to a global struggle to protect the liberal democratic world when that world was under attack from powerful illiberal forces. A great contest between open societies and totalitarian challengers was an ideological struggle but also a military and geopolitical struggle. Leading liberal thinkers of the day, such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Isaiah Berlin, and Raymond Aron, considered the survival of the democratic way of life to be at extreme risk. Western liberal democracies had stumbled in the 1920s and 1930s by failing to respond to the instabilities and inequalities of capitalist society. In response, these Cold War liberals, as Jan-Werner Müller argues, sought to “craft a principled politics of freedom for the twentieth century.”107 Their view of the threats to liberal democracy focused on both the troubled internal politics of Western societies, where the political center was threatened by extremism on the Right and the Left, and the wider world-historical struggle then unfolding with the Soviet Union and international communism. Schlesinger’s influential 1949 book The Vital Center epitomized this worldview. It offered a defense of pluralism and open societies and called for the continuation of New Deal–style reform by activist governments. But in response to the larger global challenge, Schlesinger urged collective action by the liberal democracies, led by the United States, to defend their institutions and the liberal international order from totalitarian rivals.108 The challenge to liberal democracy was manifest in a worldwide struggle between alternative visions of modernity. Cold War liberalism offered a narrative that put liberal internationalism in the service of an activist American foreign policy.109 Is the American liberal tradition inherently interventionist? Do liberal principles predispose the United States to actively seek to impose democracy on other states? A long tradition of realist thinking has argued that they do. As Henry Kissinger maintains, “the idea that peace depends above all on promoting democratic institutions has remained a staple of American thought to the present day,” and he traces this idea back to Woodrow Wilson.110 The United States is often depicted as a “crusader state” seeking, under the sway of liberal ideas, to remake the world in its own image.111 More recently, realist scholars have linked American liberalism to controversial American foreign policy actions in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, such as the doctrine justifying preventive war and forcible regime change. John Mearsheimer argues that liberalism provides the impulse and legitimating rationale for repeated episodes of American military interventionism. Liberal ambitions spurred the United States to push Western institutions to the doorsteps of Russia and China and provided the rationale for the disastrous war in Iraq. Similarly, Michael Desch traces American interventionism to the founding ideas of liberal internationalism. He sees Kantian liberalism as providing the philosophical justification for military efforts to democratize illiberal sovereign states by force. In effect, the liberal tradition generates what David Hume called an “imprudent vehemence” toward illiberal regimes.112 These claims bring the debate back to the question of whether liberalism contains an “urge” to empire. Mearsheimer and Desch essentially take the view of liberalism that is elaborated by Uday Mehta in Liberalism and Empire. Here it is not empire but military interventionism that the leading liberal state uses to bring backward people and regimes into the modern world. Intervention and regime change are embedded in the assumptions that liberalism makes about the “state of nature” and the conditions for peace. Only when all states embrace representative government will liberal democracies be truly safe. But the urge to intervene to promote democracy is clearly contingent, not absolute. Most liberal internationalists would almost certainly agree that, all else being equal, liberal democracies would be safer in a world dominated by liberal democracies. But whether this justifies forcible regime change is another matter. Kant’s view of intervention was surely more complicated—and contingent—than Desch admits. Kant did believe that a republican constitution is the ideal, he also acknowledged that even despotic states have a claim of legitimate authority that entitles them to nonintervention. Kant did argue that “perpetual peace” depends on all states developing republican forms of rule, but this does not generate a right by liberal states to bring about such a result by force.113 Michael Doyle has shown that liberalism is conflicted—even “congenitally confused”—on the question of intervention. Liberalism embraces principles that are in tension with each other. On one hand, liberal principles accord all states, including illiberal states, the right to noninterference, even when these states inflict harm on their own populations or violate their rights. On the other hand, liberalism also emphasizes that the rights of individuals in these societies must also be respected, and this opens the door—at least under extreme conditions—to intervention.114 Doyle argues that Kant “made a strong case for respecting the right of non-intervention because it afforded a polity the necessary territorial space and political independence in which free and equal citizens could work out what their way of life would be.”115 But Kant could also imagine polities that so abused their people—committing massacres or genocide, for example—that the duty of nonintervention would not apply. This contingency, of course, raises the question of how liberal states should decide whether and how to respond. Liberalism thus offers arguments for and against intervention. Georg Sørensen has described these alternative logics as the “liberalism of imposition” and the “liberalism of restraint.”116 The liberalism of imposition is manifest in the state’s employment of power to expand liberal principles. John Stuart Mill argues this position when he writes that noncivilized societies—which he calls “barbarous” nations—do not observe the rules and traditions of international morality, and therefore their independence does not merit full respect. Liberalism of restraint, Sørensen argues, stresses a different set of liberal values, such as “pluralism, non-intervention, respect for others, moderation, and peaceful cooperation on equal terms.”117 This is the vision that Gerry Simpson has called “charter liberalism,” with its values embodied in the United Nations Charter. States are accorded equality of treatment, their sovereign independence is respected, and each state is allowed to determine how to establish its own rights and protections.118 Restraint liberals recognize that some states will violate basic rights, but until some extreme line of violence and genocide is crossed diversity is tolerated, in the belief that over the long run, these societies will evolve toward universal standards of rights and decency.119 These debates within the liberal tradition burned fiercely during the years surrounding the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq. How much was liberal internationalism implicated in this decision? The Bush administration articulated a sweeping new doctrine of national security based on American global dominance, the preventive use of force, “coalitions of the willing,” and the struggle between freedom and tyranny. In the spring of 2003, this doctrine provided the intellectual backdrop for the invasion of Iraq. As the invasion turned into a protracted war, the Bush administration increasingly invoked liberal internationalist ideas to justify its actions. In his now famous second inaugural address, George W. Bush stood on the steps of the US Capitol and proclaimed, “We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands.”120 The echoes of Woodrow Wilson and the Cold War liberal internationalism of Truman and Kennedy were unmistakable. But was Bush truly Wilson’s heir? Liberal internationalists themselves debate this issue.121 Some argue that Bush followed a “neoconservative” stand of liberal internationalism, focused on putting the full weight of American power behind bringing the “blessings of liberty” to oppressed people.122 Others argue that this neoconservative turn in American foreign policy was a distortion of liberal internationalism and that the Bush grand strategy was more imperial than liberal. Multilateralism is at the heart of the liberal international vision, these people argue, but the Bush administration willfully put the United States above the rules and institutions of the liberal order. In the long run, liberal democracies will be safer and more secure in an international order undergirded by shared rules and norms, cooperative security, and mutual restraint—and the Bush administration was undermining such an order.123 Liberal internationalists clearly differ on the importance of democracy promotion to their project, and on whether democracy is best promoted through force or example.124 But were the ideological origins of the Iraq War really traceable to liberal internationalism? The principal architects of this ill-fated venture were, by all accounts, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.125 It is difficult to describe the political ideology of any of these officials as liberal internationalism. For all three, the primary objective of the war was the preservation and extension of American primacy in a region important to American national interests. They saw Iraq as a regional revisionist state with a demonstrated record of chemical-weapons use and a long-standing ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, making it a military threat to American forces and allies in the region. The decisive defeat of Iraq was also meant to provide a worldwide demonstration of America’s capacities and willingness to defend its global position against challengers such as North Korea and Iran and to dispel lingering doubts created during the Clinton years about America’s willingness to use force. In the decade before the war, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz had all been associated with efforts to enunciate a post–Cold War American grand strategy of preventing the emergence of a peer competitor.126 All three had publicly urged the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime for more than a decade before the 2003 invasion. Their utterances betrayed no trace of liberal internationalism. Put simply, the Bush administration’s policy in Iraq was decidedly realist. Prominent academic realists opposed the war, offering eloquent critiques of American hubris and grand strategy.127 But the case for war was also argued, at least initially, in realist terms. Democracy promotion was among the rolling rationales for the war offered by the Bush administration, but it is difficult to believe that this goal was the originating impulse for the war. It is more plausibly seen as the administration’s public justification for the war and possibly a template for postwar Iraqi reconstruction. Democracy was not a core objective: it emerged later, as a program for making Iraq into a pillar of the hegemonic American order in the region.128 Some liberal internationalists supported the war and others opposed it, but many of those supporters were less focused on democracy promotion than on the genuinely frightening threats that weapons of mass destruction posed and on the search for responses to this threat when deterrence and arms control were not effective. (It turned out, of course, that the reason Hussein could not be persuaded to give up his weapons of mass destruction was that he had nothing to give up, and he wanted to hide this fact from neighboring enemies like Iran.) Finding cooperative solutions to rising problems of security interdependence was at the top of the post–September 11 liberal internationalist agenda, but it tended to get lost in the controversies over the Iraq War.129 Even if one could disentangle American liberalism from power politics, it is not clear that a purely realist-oriented foreign policy would be more restrained or enlightened. There is no necessary link between liberal internationalism and coercive regime change. Liberalism may provide reasons to intervene abroad, but it also provides ideological and institutional mechanisms that restrain the exercise of military power. Realist critics think they can prevent another Iraq by removing liberal internationalist ideas from policymaking. But liberal internationalism also inspired the building of the wider system of postwar rules, institutions, and partnerships. Realists cannot assume that this system would have been built in a purely realist world of offshore balancing. If the goal is a “restrained” foreign policy, the postwar system of rules and institutions that ties the liberal democracies together under shared commitments and rules of conduct is surely part of the solution and not the problem.130 A large part of the resistance to the Bush administration’s war in Iraq was based on standards of conduct that the United States had championed. Western Europeans, for example, criticized the war as a transgression of liberal internationalist notions of sovereignty, multilateralism, and international law. Two scholars have called this “liberal anti-Americanism.”131 If military interventionism is not inherent in either liberalism or realism, the question comes down to the quality of political institutions and decision making. Does the United States learn from its mistakes? The lack of enthusiasm for new Iraqi-style interventions does suggest that foreign policy decision makers—liberal internationalists or not— do rethink their views.

### A2 US Bad

#### US liberalism was key to anti-imperial struggle—opposition to imperial powers and building platforms for state sovereignty

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Finally, the deepest and most far-reaching force separating liberalism from empire has been the struggle over the global expansion of the Westphalian state system. A world of sovereign states was a precondition for the spread of liberal internationalism. Therefore, the struggle to extend sovereign rights of statehood to peoples and nations was the real bulwark against empire. By building on and reinforcing this grand shift from empire to the nation-state, liberal internationalism ultimately placed its “project” within the Westphalian system—it became, in a sense, the set of ideas for organizing the world once the world finally shed its imperial foundations. Empire had ordered the world for centuries, and when the twentieth century asked what would replace empire as the world’s organizing logic, liberal internationalism stepped forward as the alternative. How the Westphalian state system came to encompass the world is a question that still requires scholarly attention.100 The sovereign state arrived quite late for most regions outside the West—essentially in the twentieth century, after the world wars. For most of the past five hundred years, European great powers were not eager to export or universalize the Westphalian order. They held on to empire and colonies until forced to give them up. In this sense, the spread of Westphalia is not a story of the imposition of a Western idea on the rest of the world, but of the failure of the European state system to sustain empire.101 To pursue movements for independence and selfdetermination on their own, peoples and societies outside Europe took advantage of the cracks and clashes in the European imperial system. As noted earlier, Edward Keene argues that great wars between liberal and totalitarian states discredited the old civilizational vision of sovereignty and imperial hierarchy. Christian Reus-Smit finds, in the universalization of norms of sovereignty and self-determination after two hundred years of struggles over individual rights, a story of the “evolution and transmission of the legitimating institutions that sustain sovereignty.”102 This surely is part of the explanation. But it remains to be explained why empires, as a form of global order, failed. John Darwin argues that empires have tended to fail for four reasons: “external defeat or geopolitical weakness; ideological contagion and the loss of legitimacy; domestic enfeeblement at the centre of empire—the loss of political will and economic capacity; and colonial revolt.”103 All of these triggers of imperial crisis seemed to be present in the twentieth century. Considered as wars of empire, the world wars decisively weakened and brought to an end the European system of empire. In this drama, the United States played an important role in both undercutting empire and promoting the Westphalian state system. It did this first during the two world wars, by joining and later leading coalitions of allies that ultimately defeated states with expansive imperial projects. In World War I it was Imperial Germany, which had conquered a large area of Eastern Europe and seized much of the Russian Empire’s western territories. This war resulted in the collapse of four long-established European empires: Romanov Russia, Habsburg Austria-Hungary, Hohenzollern Germany, and Ottoman Turkey. World War II effectively finished off the Japanese empire and severely weakened the British and French empires, though the latter two, because they were on the winning side, took a couple of decades to dissolve. During the Cold War, the United States also engaged in balancing against the Soviet Union—seeking to contain the expansion of Soviet power and influence as well as thwarting communist coups and revolutions in many weak, independent states. At the same time, as noted earlier, the United States played a variety of roles in facilitating states’ ability to survive as independent members of international society. It led efforts to institutionalize Westphalian norms of nonaggression and sovereign independence, first with the League of Nations and then with the United Nations Charter. In the second half of the twentieth century, the American-led international order institutionalized open trade and multilateral cooperation, providing the infrastructure for a global economic system, which in turn strengthened the smaller states’ ability to sustain their sovereignty. Also in the second half of the twentieth century, the American system of military alliances dampened violent conflicts among allied states, particularly in Europe and East Asia, and this prevented the Westphalian system from falling back into violent conflict and empire building.104 Thus the “American century” was also the century of the global spread of the nation-state. They were different political projects, but each helped the other gain ground.